

example, of the savings and loan industry, wreaking havoc on established responsibilities from one end of the budget to the other. Programs would be cut not because they failed to produce needed benefits commensurate with their costs, the best test of public policy. Instead, they would be cut because, perhaps, of an increase in oil prices or economic recessions among our trading partners, that could result in a slowdown in our domestic economy.

Or, programs could be cut because of a failure in a federally insured program such as the banking or savings and loan system, or even because of natural disasters such as droughts or floods that create unanticipated demands on available Federal funds. Prohibited from borrowing for unforeseen contingencies, we would disrupt established programs, sacrificing consistent and efficient Government operations for an abstract ideal.

On the other hand, we may choose not to cut spending in response to unforeseen events—including the drop in Government revenues that comes with economic recession. In that case, significant tax increases would be required to meet our obligations. But sizable tax increases in response to largely uncontrollable or unforeseeable events would disrupt the plans of citizens and businesses that have a right to expect a stable environment for economic activity.

All economists agree that an uncertain tax environment weakens the incentive to make the long-term investments our economy must have if we are to meet the demands of the new international economy. Such tax increases would also add an increased burden to our economy in recession, reinforcing, not counterbalancing, swings in the business cycle.

Finally, Mr. President, a universal practice of State governments is the establishment of agencies with bonding authority: Highway and water departments, for example, this means of evading State budget restrictions has resulted in fragmentation of Government authority among multiple agencies with the power to issue bonds for long-term spending priorities. At the Federal level, this potential response to a balanced budget amendment would mean the proliferation of unelected bureaucracies, further blurring the responsibility for our country's spending and taxing priorities.

Mr. President, whatever my colleagues may believe about the merits of a balanced budget constitutional amendment, I hope our consideration of such proposals will be based on the facts of State budget process and the very real differences between State and Federal responsibilities. A constitutional amendment is a step that should not be taken lightly, or as a matter of venting passing frustration. The ques-

tions I have raised today need responsible, credible answers before we take such a profound step.

One of the greatest threats to our long-term economic health and to the efficient functioning of our democratic institutions is our continuing liability to match our spending with our income. But as we wrestle with this issue, particularly as we contemplate the profound step of amending our Constitution, we must seek solutions that accomplish our goals.

Mr. President, there are arguments for a balanced budget amendment that deserve our attention and our careful consideration. But we should not base such an important decision on misunderstandings and inappropriate comparisons with State budget practices.

#### AN AMERICAN AGENDA FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER C. ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY D. LAUNCHING AN ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in two previous addresses on the new world order, I began by placing this concept in historical perspective and then proposed a four-part agenda that I believe this Nation must pursue in order to realize the full potential inherent in that momentous phrase.

It is my contention that we must look to history for inspiration in this task: To the vision of Woodrow Wilson and the subsequent achievements of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in laying the groundwork for fulfillment of the Wilsonian vision.

It is, I believe, the duty of this generation of Americans to complete the task that Woodrow Wilson began.

Today, I shall describe the third and fourth parts of America's agenda for a new world order: organizing for collective military security, and launching a worldwide economic-environmental revolution.

In advancing, on a new world order agenda, toward an expanded commitment to the collective use of armed force, where necessary.

We have two, related avenues for progress.

The first avenue involves a new role for NATO; the second, a more regularized exercise of the enforcement power of the United Nations Security Council.

The collapse of the Soviet empire would by itself require that we reexamine NATO's premises; the Atlantic alliance was created to deter a threat that no longer exists.

But this task is given urgency by the endemic violence now scarring the European landscape.

How do we prevent such conflicts?

And how do we respond, should they erupt?

By inviting the former states of the Warsaw Pact into a new North Atlantic

cooperation council—the so-called NAC-C.

NATO has wisely moved beyond the cold war to create an all-European consultative body that can play a useful educational and advisory role on matters of security.

But consultation is not enough.

NATO's integrated planning and command structure constitutes an asset unique in the world.

Of all the world's multinational institutions—a veritable alphabet soup—only NATO has the ability to bring coordinated, multinational military force to bear.

But if this asset is to be relevant to post-cold war realities, it must be re-oriented to serve the current security interests of alliance members.

Militarily, NATO has not yet adapted to the post-cold war era. Even as it now develops a new strategy that will accommodate reduced force levels, its military orientation remains unchanged: It remains the defense of allied territory against direct attack.

This military posture is an anachronism.

Instead of tiptoeing toward a revised mandate, NATO should make a great leap forward—by adopting peacekeeping outside NATO territory as a formal alliance mission.

Two steps are essential: First, alliance political leaders must task NATO's military commanders to undertake the requisite preparations in both planning and force reconfiguration, second, alliance members must agree on a new political framework under which forces would be committed.

Ideally, this framework will provide that NATO assets would be used if requested by either of two legitimate political authorities—the U.N. Security Council, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE].

It should not be NATO's aspiration to become the world's police force.

But NATO does offer, uniquely, what in some circumstances may be crucial: A core of military forces that can act rapidly, cohesively, and with considerable power.

If NATO can not summon the will and solidarity to perform this function, then the question must soon arise, in this body and among the American people:

What further role is there for the North Atlantic Alliance?

Unfortunately, for some months now, the Bush administration has allowed itself to be diverted by a comparatively petty concern—arising from the initiative of France and Germany to form a small Euro-force.

Over time, military cooperation between these two historic rivals could conceivably provide the core for an independent all-European security force, no longer reliant upon the United States to provide the cement for collective defense.

But why the Bush administration regards this as an alarming specter can be explained only by postulating that the administration has little concept of historic change.

There are two possibilities: either the Franco-German initiative will fizzle, as have all previous attempts to breathe life into west European security cooperation;

Or such efforts will finally, in the post-cold war era, bear fruit.

But even if all-European defense cooperation does succeed, it will evolve only slowly—and only as West European leaders and publics reach a conclusion they are not yet even close to reaching:

That Europe would be better off relying on Germany and France—without the United States—for leadership in collective defense.

Meanwhile, far more urgent and serious business lies in rendering NATO relevant to real needs in the immediate post-cold-war period.

The United States remains the leader of the alliance and should act like it.

A transformation is required, and the Bush administration has not yet supplied the leadership to accomplish it.

In Europe under CSCE auspices, or worldwide under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, NATO forces should henceforth be available for peacekeeping or intervention when either of those political authorities, in which our own voice will be prominent, has reached a collective determination to act.

The second avenue toward expanded readiness for collective military action is to equip the U.N. Security Council to exercise the police and enforcement powers set forth in the U.N. Charter—but rarely used.

Progress on this avenue involves changes in membership and in the availability of forces.

A reordering of the Security Council—the most prestigious and potent of U.N. organs—is necessary because the present structure of permanent membership—America, Britain, France, Russia, and China—reflects the outcome on the battlefield of World War II and is as outdated as NATO's current security posture.

Since then, Japan has become an economic superpower and Germany the dominant power in a unifying European community that did not then even exist.

From a global perspective, these nations, together with the United States, are now the leading powers of the industrialized north.

India, a colony when the second world war ended, is now the world's largest democratic state and—with one-sixth of all humanity—the leading voice of the scores of less-developed nations that comprise the south.

The absence of such countries from the organ embodying the U.N.'s most

solemn responsibilities has become an unacceptable anomaly in an organization we must seek to empower.

In the 1990's and beyond, economic strength and political leadership will be the currency of power in a world no longer divided by ideology but still plagued by real and pressing problems of security—problems encompassing poverty, ethnic conflict, migration, disease, environmental degradation, as well as an age-old source: human aggression.

The U.N. Security Council must reflect the reality of world power and the reality of world problems; it must comprise those countries with the resources—both material and human—to address the full range of global security concerns.

Negotiation of membership changes will be arduous; but the clear goal will be to reconcile two objectives:

Enhancing the Security Council's stature through a broadened membership, while avoiding the chronic stalemate that could result from increased participation.

The very process of membership change can also be used to promote an objective central to our new strategy of containment.

At present, as it happens, the five permanent members of the Security Council are the world's five acknowledged nuclear powers.

Yet nuclear weapons—as the case of the now-defunct Soviet Union demonstrates—confer power in only the most limited sense.

As this permanent membership is broadened to include such non-nuclear states as Japan and Germany—and border-line nuclear states such as India—the delegitimization of nuclear arms should be made a formal and affirmative policy.

The price of new membership on the U.N. Security Council should be an unconditional pledge to remain or become non-nuclear.

With this policy, we accomplish two objectives simultaneously: modernizing the Security Council's membership and further demonetizing nuclear weapons as the currency of international power.

In the case of Japan and Germany, this will entail only the perpetuation of existing policy and treaty commitments. For India, it would mean acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, accepting rigorous international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and giving up an ambiguous status that has, in reality, provided little benefit to that nation and entailed much risk.

The inclusion of Germany, Japan and India as permanent non-nuclear members of the Security Council would validate new conceptions of power in the post-cold war world.

India's membership under the non-nuclear condition would have the addi-

tional advantage of ending south Asia's dangerous nuclear arms race, since Pakistan has already agreed to sign the NPT if India will so agree. India's accession to the Security Council could thereby become a catalyst for progress on security problems that have plagued, and squandered the resources, of the Indian subcontinent.

These nations and others deserve a place in the U.N. commensurate with their size and significance, and the process of reorganization can confirm and uphold larger aims.

Catalyzing this transition will require the good offices—and the sustained leadership—of the United States. Rather than holding back, in the style of the Bush administration, America should initiate this change—with a sense of magnanimity and purpose befitting the U.N.'s predominant power.

A more pressing need, on which we should act without awaiting the negotiation of membership change, is to further empower the Security Council through the standing availability of military forces.

One remarkable development of recent years—a true precursor of the new world order—is the U.N.'s active and competent role in fostering the settlement of conflicts in Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, El Salvador, and Cambodia.

This momentum in collective action must be sustained, and its purpose widened to include combat interventions where principle and justice warrant.

As well as blue helmets to preside over cease-fires, actual combat units should be at the Security Council's disposal—and not merely on an ad hoc basis where the process of assembling a consensus, followed by troop commitments, may be too slow to meet urgent need.

The coalition-building process that proved successful in the Gulf War does not constitute an adequate paradigm for all interventions the U.N. may deem necessary.

Future crises may require greater speed, and we should strive to create circumstances that do not impose upon the United States the onus either to act unilaterally, or to galvanize a U.N. action in which we supply the preponderance of military power.

It was precisely this preference that Pentagon planners exhibited in the recent strategy document that envisaged, with some relish, the exercise of worldwide American military hegemony in the post-cold war era.

Once leaked, this concept—which I dubbed "America as globo-cop"—was repudiated by the Bush administration as an embarrassment.

But in truth, the unilateralist mindset continues to blind this administration to our new and expensive opportunity to involve other nations more fully and systematically in international security.



To realize the full potential of collective security, we must divest ourselves of the vainglorious dream of a pax Americana—and look instead for a means to regularize swift, multinational decision and response.

The mechanism to achieve this lies—unused—in article 43 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that:

All members undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 43 provides that the agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible. But for 47 years that condition was not met: the cold war polarization that beset the United Nations made it impossible for such force commitments to be negotiated.

The agreements envisaged by the U.N. founders—under which nations would designate specific units to be available to the Security Council—have never been made.

Article 43, at present, is a promise unfulfilled. The time has come: the United States, in conjunction with other key nations, should now designate forces under article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

Let it be underscored, for all who would quaver at this proposal, that such action does not require a leap of faith: it does not mean the entrusting of American security—or the entrusting of American troops—to a collective body of questionable reliability.

The assignment of United States and other forces to the United Nations means only that specifically designated troop units are committed.

First, to participate in advance planning for coordinated use, and second, to be available for action pursuant to a U.N. Security Council decision to which the United States itself must be a party.

If deployed under U.N. auspices, a designated American unit or units—a force that might number some 3,000–8,000 troops—would be used only in conjunction with other forces—and for a purpose agreed to by the United States as a leading member of the Security Council.

The essence of such an arrangement is not to increase the probability of American casualties in combat.

On the contrary, our purpose in proceeding under article 43 is to build multilateral institutions in which collective force can be reliably used without constant dependence on American Armed Forces.

The United States would designate forces under an article 43 agreement only if it entailed similar and substantial commitments by other powers.

Thus, by designating a relatively small contingent of American forces, we would draw other nations into obligations of military responsibility.

In sum, the assignment to the U.N. Security Council of American and other military units would enhance one valuable instrument of American foreign policy—that is, participation in collective military action—without increasing the overall risk to American forces and without the slightest detriment to our ability to act alone if necessary.

Stated conversely, if we do not move to realize the potential of collective action under article 43, we consign ourselves to future dependency on the kind of ad hoc, American-led response that characterized the Gulf war.

That model may be attractive to some, in that it gives us primacy of place. But in my view, it is unfair, unnecessary, and unwise.

Article 43 represents a means by which the United States can enhance the efficacy of collective security while reducing the likelihood that future crises will compel the men and women of the American Armed Forces to bear a disproportionate burden in collective security. To encourage negotiation of article 43 commitments by the United States and other powers, I will this week introduce the collective security participation resolution.

This joint resolution would affirm congressional support for the consummation of an article 43 agreement; and it would reaffirm the intent of Congress expressed in the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, in three important respects: first, an article 43 agreement shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution. Second, the President shall not be deemed to require [further] authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call the military units designated in the agreement. Third, this authorization may not be construed as authorization to use forces in addition to those forces designated.

Clearly, the enactment of this measure would be only a first step. But it is intended—and I believe it could serve—to create momentum.

What the collective security participation resolution would signify is congressional acceptance, in advance of any article 43 negotiation, of the premise of article 43: that the major powers should be positioned to act, without further delay, once the U.N. Security Council has achieved a consensus to use predesignated forces.

As a dedicated defender of the war power as a shared constitutional power, I stress that this arrangement, if achieved, would not represent an abdication by Congress of its responsibilities.

Rather, it would be a judicious congressional exercise of the war power: the delineation by statute of conditions under which the President has limited authority to use force.

Enactment of the collective security participation resolution, while not necessary as a matter of legal technicality, would be valuable as a matter of political reality.

For four decades—beginning with the Korean war and extending through the Vietnam war to the gulf war—we have engaged in an agonizing constitutional struggle over the war power.

Against that background of chronic dispute, in which I myself have been a dedicated participant, I believe it important that the Congress of today render a modern affirmation concerning the war power: By endorsing a principle of collective security—and the mechanism to carry it out—that the founders of the United Nations and the Congress of 1945 were prepared to affirm nearly half a century ago.

By doing so, we can encourage presidential initiative within the United Nations and provide a solid footing for American leadership in strengthening the U.N. as an instrument of collective security.

By enacting the collective security participation resolution, Congress would affirm its support for a sound article 43 agreement as integral to a serious American agenda for a new world order.

The potential value of enhanced institutional preparedness for collective military action is underscored by the ongoing disaster in Yugoslavia.

There, a barbarism unexpected in modern Europe has unfolded in the face of outside disbelief and a growing recognition of the world's unreadiness, even after the Gulf war, to act decisively with collective military force.

For some months, Western nations—all in hope of minimizing the violence—disagreed on the tactics of whether and when to recognize the former Yugoslav Republics as they declared independence. But this disagreement has now been replaced by common horror at the wanton brutalities being inflicted by Serbian forces.

Were the U.N. Security Council or the CSCE adequately equipped, both by political disposition and the ready availability of military forces, the question of intervention could now be addressed on its merits, without the impediment of massive institutional complexity.

The question of intervention in Yugoslavia instructs us: If our multinational bodies are to act when needed, we must first prepare them to act.

If we are to find any gain from the tragedy of Yugoslavia, it must be in the momentum it provides in moving us more swiftly down both paths of expanded commitment to collective military action—

The formal adoption by NATO of a peacekeeping and intervention role, and a more formal commitment by key U.N. members to military action under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.

Just as Neville Chamberlain's trip to Munich in 1938 stands as a permanent warning of the futility of appeasement, the unabated slaughter in Bosnia offers a new lesson: If we do not prepare for collective action, the end of the cold war could usher in not a new world order but an era of endless interethnic bloodletting.

American leadership to achieve this expanded commitment to collective security will serve, together a new strategy of weapons containment, to complete the military dimension of our new world order agenda.

The fourth part of America's agenda for a new world order encompasses all we must do in the Herculean task of sustaining and broadening mankind's prosperity while preserving the global environment.

The two elements of this task are related: first, to maintain and further perfect the system of open world trade; second, to infuse this system with revolutionary new priorities—developmental and environmental—reflecting the global opportunities and perils we clearly foresee already in the 1990's and beyond.

The world system of free trade—though we have come to take it for granted, perceiving mainly its flaws—is among the salient achievements of the postwar era, embodying a lesson learned harshly during the downward spiral of protectionism in the 1930's.

America's bedrock economic task today, as the world's leader and leading trader, is to preserve this system and mold it wisely, as the key to prosperity for ourselves and our allies and as the lifeline for growth in the developing world.

This task centers on the most ambitious trade negotiations ever undertaken: the current phase of GATT talks, known as the Uruguay round.

Trade experts project that, if successful, the Uruguay round will increase world output and demand by \$5 trillion over the next decade. That equates to \$500 billion per year, or \$100 annually for every man, woman, and child on the planet.

Our aim in these negotiations—in defense of United States interests as well as broader principles—is to open new markets to American producers and to American service industries such as banking and insurance.

This objective entails the continuing toil of determined diplomacy—to identify and eliminate unfair trade practices, whether they be discriminatory barriers to our exports or services, or illegal subsidies to foreign goods competing with our own.

The highest American priority is the domestic market of Japan. In the GATT and in direct bilateral negotiations that must be as candid as may prove necessary, we must weed out the welter of nontariff barriers facing Americans and others who wish to ex-

port to a large Japanese market that is permeated with impediments to penetration.

A priority only slightly subordinate is the European Community. There we must continue to fight the excessive barriers and subsidies that protect and over-incentivize European agriculture; and we must ensure that the final stage of economic unification—the internal tariff elimination and regulatory harmonization known as EC-92—does not yield, in any industry, a "fortress Europe" impregnable to those outside.

A GATT objective of longer-term priority is to incorporate the emerging nations of the former Soviet empire fully into the GATT system, thereby opening Western markets to their products and quickening the pace of Western investment in their industries.

Our simultaneous task, in continuing to open markets, is to complete work on a regional trade pact—the North American Free-Trade Agreement—that would create our own common market with Canada and Mexico.

All three parties can gain—but only with stipulations on Mexican wage rates and environmental standards that ensure against a rush of northern industry to the south.

No principle of efficiency would be served by abetting the rise of a low-wage pollution belt across the Mexican border.

Soundly conducted, these trade negotiations can benefit the United States and all other parties at once—a philosophy the Bush administration correctly affirms.

Where danger lies is in the Bush administration's excessive dedication to the principle of *laissez-faire*. Not only is the administration committed to noninterference in the world trade, it has exhibited precisely the same ideological commitment to noninterference in the full range of issues in American domestic policy—issues that bear directly on improving American competitiveness in the free trade system.

A principle wisely applied in one realm has yielded a vacuum of leadership in another, and the two do not stand alone. Free trade is dependent on public support for free trade, and public support for free trade is dependent on public confidence in free trade.

Today the American people have grown acutely aware of the decline in our educational standards, our industries, and our cities, and they discern quite clearly that the Bush administration lacks any strategic plan whatsoever: either to correct these deficiencies—or to promote American competitiveness in the world economy in the years ahead.

We have national deficits in budget and trade; we have a national deficit in investment in research, infrastructure, and human capital—and we have a national deficit in leadership to correct

these fundamental shortcomings that are propelling us into a downward spiral.

By failing to inspire any confidence among the American people that our country will remain adequately competitive in the post-cold war period, and indeed by pandering to fears that it may not, the Bush administration has undermined American public support for the free trade system.

Until American confidence, American competitiveness, and the American trade balance are restored, not only will the United States remain in jeopardy as a stable society; so too will a global system of free trade that depends upon American leadership. But the Bush administration's pervasive *laissez-faire* philosophy—perhaps better described as pervasive inaction—is a liability not simply in maintaining open world trade.

More injurious still is the administration's determined resistance to performing America's crucial leadership role in reorienting world production and trade—to meet developmental and environmental needs that bear upon America's future and all of mankind's.

The hazards of the Bush administration's abdication of world leadership were on vivid display last month at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development—the Earth summit—in Rio de Janeiro.

The issues in Rio were as broad as this administration's horizons are narrow: the effect of man on Earth, and the ability of man to rescue himself from the adverse consequences of his own creativity—and fecundity.

Through the centuries, both religion and hope have led us to expect that the marvelous web of life—the interaction of living beings with land, air, and water—is infinitely resilient and immune to the meager actions of man. This comforting myth has been shattered forever.

Scientists now know—and citizens of the world are beginning to understand—that mankind rivals the great forces of nature as an agent of global change. A great realization has dawned worldwide that manmade changes, in their aggregate, are profoundly perilous for man himself.

The President, and his apologists take refuge in the contention that the ambiguities of scientific evidence render predictions uncertain. But as the world's leaders gathered in Rio were quick to understand, the President's sophistry was a mask for his courting of domestic corporate and ideological interests: Corporate interests averse to the very idea of environmental rules, and ideological interests possessed of a visceral disdain for their own countrymen, and others in the world, called environmentalists.

The Environment Minister of Germany put it candidly in stating that the Bush administration, in its search



for politically divisive themes, appears determined to find a new "ism" to replace the bogeyman of communism, and has apparently alighted on the idea of "ecologism" as the new menace against which it will courageously take its stand.

H.L. Mencken, a seasoned cynic who could have learned still more from the Bush administration, said that the whole purpose of politics is to keep the electorate riled up by imaginary hobgoblins.

The Bush administration's new "hobgoblins" are Third World bureaucrats who would pick our Nation's pocket while regulating us into poverty. Someday, perhaps in retirement, the President may wish to contemplate just how other leaders—great American presidents and current leaders from the world's other prosperous nations—have managed to govern without such phony demons.

The great linkage under discussion in Rio—explicit in the name of the Conference and implicit in all that was said—is the connection between world development and the environment.

The unifying principle is sustainability: the imperative that future economic growth in all countries be conducted in a manner that can be sustained within limits imposed by the Earth's environment. This imperative derives from truths that are not under scientific dispute and cannot be dismissed even by the most irresponsible political leaders:

The Earth's population, which has doubled in my lifetime, will double again in the lifetime of my children. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth's forests, great engines of the biosphere and bounteous as sanctuaries for plant and animal life of incalculable value, and fast disappearing. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth's oceans are rapidly becoming fouled by a ceaseless flow of human garbage that is poisoning all sea-life, and fish not yet poisoned are being harvested from the seas more quickly than they can reproduce. These trends cannot be sustained.

The Earth's supply of fresh water, only one drop for each gallon of salt water and crucial to man and many other species, is declining. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth's diversity of life—animal and plant life in its multitudinous forms—is being extinguished at a rate that will see the disappearance of one-fourth of all species within the next 40 years. This trend cannot be sustained.

The stratosphere above the Earth continues to accumulate tons of man-made carbon gases that will inevitably, and perhaps disastrously, affect the entire global climate. This trend cannot be sustained.

These trends appear inexorable, but they are not.

Someday they will end—the only question is how.

Will they end through man's rational containment and redirection of his own activities? Or will they end in human catastrophe beyond our current imagination? This was the question under discussion in Rio de Janeiro—in an unprecedented global forum that constituted the largest assemblage of world leaders in human history.

To this assemblage the Bush administration brought little but braggadocio and contempt. In Rio, the President of the United States uttered two truths—but both in a perverse context. His presentation gave new meaning to a century-old observation by William James, the venerable American philosopher: "There is no worse lie," said James, "than a truth misunderstood."

The first truth recited by the President, who deployed it as an excuse for withholding support for global action, is the record of American environmental achievement over the last two decades. This record, although flawed by the world's highest rate of carbon emissions into the atmosphere, is indeed substantial.

But our attainments center on domestic pollution control—the clean-up of America's air, water, and toxic waste—actions that support current global imperatives but, even if emulated by all nations—will be insufficient to prevent catastrophe. America's record demonstrates that individual nations can take concerted action.

What the President refused to accept was the need to establish obligations among all nations to take not only the first steps that America has helped to pioneer but the many more steps required if we are to curb national actions with severely adverse global consequences.

The second truth articulated by the President was the connection between environmental protection and economic growth—a fact also undisputed, since this was the very theme of the Earth summit. But here Mr. Bush took truth—and turned it on its head.

In the implied demonology described by our President, the choice is between the environment and growth, which he caricatured by portraying the issue as "jobs." But this is a false choice. The real truth, undistorted—is that we can not continue economic growth—in America or in a developing world desperate to advance out of poverty—without reorienting the process of growth to encompass environmental protection. Growth can continue only if it is sustainable—this is a tautology that must become the guiding principle of America's domestic and international economic policy.

If Rio generated despair, it was because the President of the United States—alone among the major participants there—appeared not to understand and accept this principle.

A common and pertinent observation about the Rio Conference was the failure of the conferees to come to grips with the overwhelming issue of world population. The reasons for this are not obscure and reflect genuine political impediments rather than hypocrisy.

Although all concerned recognize the burgeoning of human numbers as a fundamental source of global poverty and environmental degradation, efforts to limit population growth run afoul—as Americans themselves are well aware—of deep-seated religious, cultural, and ideological belief.

What cannot be disputed is the inevitability of dramatic change in human patterns of procreation in the decades ahead. This will occur in one of three ways: As a result of catastrophe involving enormous misery, through draconian measures imposed by societies, or—the one palatable possibility—by a voluntary change in human behavior.

By all past evidence of human conduct, a noncoercive behavior change—a voluntary stabilization of human numbers—occurs only in societies that are developed. Whereas poverty yields multiplying numbers as families try to grow to survive, prosperity yields population stability. Therefore, the single scenario not horrible to contemplate entails development as the key to limiting the inexorable growth in global population.

But if economies must grow in order for populations to stabilize, the necessity of an economic-environmental revolution is underscored, for if the billions of people in the Third World follow the development path of the millions in the first world, emulating our patterns of resource exploitation and pollution, the Earth will fast approach the threshold of uninhabitability.

Thus, the question of population carries us back immediately to the necessity of sustainable economic growth and the environmental concerns that go with it.

In assessing the Bush administration's debacle in Rio, historians are likely to conclude what already seems apparent: that the blunder was both tactical and strategic.

Tactically, there was little need for the administration's negativism on the two major treaties awaiting signature.

The treaty the President insisted on weakening—designed to protect the global climate through limits on the emission of greenhouse gases—contained targets and timetables that the United States is very likely to meet even without a treaty obligation.

Thus, the President's achievement in eliminating obligatory targets and timetables consisted primarily in relieving all other nations of what would have been a strict and immensely valuable commitment.

Similarly, on the treaty designed to slow the extinction of diverse animal

and plant life, there was scant need on the merits for the President's ostentatious refusal to sign.

The treaty's pledge to support biodiversity, and its mandate that biotechnology companies share the proceeds of genetic wealth with the countries in which they find it, was sufficiently flexible that all other major nations found it possible to join. Only the United States, with the White House plainly in search of an us versus them confrontation, withheld support.

But the administration's strategic failure in Rio de Janeiro was even more pronounced.

The climate and biodiversity treaties will go into effect, and eventually a more enlightened administration will seek to recover the ground lost by President Bush in Rio.

But in the meantime, the President will have foregone a singular opportunity—not only to help reorient the world economy but also to educate the American people as to a new and promising role they may play within it.

The President wished to convey to his political constituency that he was, in effect, saving the American economy from an unpleasant dose of castor oil.

But in truth—a truth the American people are fully capable of grasping—environmentally sound technology holds great promise for the American economy.

There is, first, the underlying principle that the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies will eventually render all American industry more competitive.

But beyond that principle is the vast industry of environmental technology itself—technology in which the United States is already a world leader.

As the world makes its necessary turn toward the use of such technology, America is well positioned to dominate this exponentially expanding global market.

In Western Europe alone, the market for environmental services in which the United States is a world leader—air pollution control, water treatment, waste management, and ground decontamination—is expected to approach \$200 billion per year within this decade.

Already, European industries in need of services are turning to American firms that have established themselves on this technology's cutting edge.

A visionary American President would not be rejecting the advent of an economic-environmental revolution.

He would be promoting the revolution, as a world need and an American economic opportunity.

In allowing himself to be eclipsed at the Earth summit, even by allied leaders who tried not to do so, the President seemed oblivious to the competitive implications of the global revolution for which the Earth summit will be the launching pad, with or without the Bush administration:

When the Japanese Government pledged generous levels of global environmental assistance, did the President comprehend that this pledge not only boosted Japan's diplomatic stature—but that the assistance itself will boost Japanese industries in competition with our own for an enormously lucrative global market?

In contrast to the President's cramped and narrow view of environmentalism, the American people must take the broadest possible view, recognizing that the needs of the future environmentally can be the wave of the future economically.

For the United States, it should become a paramount priority, pervading all future trade and assistance policy, to promote American environmental technologies and services around the world.

To that end, I will introduce the Environmental Aid and Trade Act—legislation designed to establish this priority in the organizational structure, and actions, of every Federal agency involved in U.S. trade and aid: the Department of Commerce, the Agency for International Development, the Trade and Development program, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Our own prosperity and environment, and the world's will be the beneficiaries of such a concerted American strategy.

By no means does an emphasis on technology suggest that current planetary trends are susceptible to an easy fix.

As human numbers explode, pressing hard already against earthly limits, we have every reason to be sober.

In the face of current global statistics and projections, even an inveterate optimist could easily conclude that our own generation, or at best our children's, will be the last on this planet to enjoy the natural magnificence—and munificence—we have known.

But it is not our need to choose between optimism and pessimism—in what we must begin to regard as a race to save our planet.

What is necessary is to choose action over denial.

Only a fool—or a national leadership out of touch with all reality—could be persuaded that these problems will solve themselves.

At this moment of deep disappointment among many Americans—an overall disappointment at the failure of their national leadership and a specific disappointment at the President's abject failure to lead at a world summit of historic import—Americans may find value in the words of one of their great authors.

As William Faulkner accepted the 1949 Nobel Prize for literature, just as America had assumed world leadership of a renewed quest for Wilsonian cooperation, he spoke of the ultimate fate of mankind:

It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure:

That when the last dingdong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening.

That even then there will still be one more sound: That of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking.

I refuse to accept this. I believe that man will not merely endure: He will prevail.

He is immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice,

But because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance.

Today the American people are challenged, as much as at any moment in their history, to summon the spirit of which William Faulkner spoke.

In revitalizing our own society, as by a looming environmental crisis, we are challenged to endure and to prevail.

Our task in achieving a sustainable prosperity for mankind requires a revolution in human thought—and deed.

We need, first, a worldwide consensus on a revolutionary new direction, a consensus of which America must be a part; and the world must then act on that consensus, with America in the lead. In this—indeed, in all four parts of America's new world order agenda—the gap between what the Bush administration is doing and what we need to do is monumental.

To outline an American agenda directed at cementing the foundation for—and erecting—a new world order in the 1990's and beyond is to see both the compelling promise of the concept and the sad vacuity of the present administration's professed support for it.

It has for some time been taken as a given that the Bush administration's strong suit is foreign policy.

But mere acquaintance with foreign leaders, accompanied by stasis in the realm of action, is not a foreign policy.

Indeed, if the criterion of a sound foreign policy is that it comprise coherent initiatives and responses in the world arena—directed at promoting well-conceived national interests—then the Bush administration is perilously close to being without a foreign policy.

President Bush began his administration with the homily that America has more will than wallet.

But this administration has demonstrated that its limitation is quite the reverse.

We are a wealthy and gifted Nation, in danger of squandering its human and material resources, and abdicating our duty to lead the world, because of a failure of our national leadership to galvanize our national will.

With the imperatives now building around us, we can no longer afford an American foreign policy of denial and drift.

Taken together, the five legislative measures I am offering to support America's new world order agenda can, I am confident, be an asset to an activist President.

But no legislation can substitute for the Presidential leadership so urgently



required if America is now to fulfill the role history offers.

As we look back on the century now ending, and all of its dazzling change, we see three events to which I would attach surprising significance: the great war, the Holocaust, and the collapse of the totalitarian idea.

The great war shattered what the Austrian dramatist and philosopher Stefan Zweig, called "the world of yesterday"—but opened new horizons for democracy and collective responsibility.

The Holocaust, wrought by the deadly combination of human evil and human neglect, demonstrated the bottomless horror into which mankind might fall if it failed to accept the challenge—and realize the opportunities—to which Woodrow Wilson had given eloquent voice.

Now, as the century nears its close, the near-universal repudiation of the totalitarian idea has removed the last great obstacle to the Wilsonian vision.

The paramount question facing us today, as Americans in an interdependent world, is whether we will seize our opportunity—or fall prey again to the same lapse of vision, judgment, and will to which this Nation succumbed some 70 years ago.

Next year a new memorial—the Holocaust Memorial Museum—will open in our Nation's Capital.

It is rising now, just across the Tidal Basin from the sublimely beautiful memorial to the author of the Declaration of Independence—and just steps from the great obelisk honoring our first President.

Some will question why the Mall in Washington should be the site for the formal remembrance of a barbarism half a world away.

For me there is a good answer.

This new memorial will join with those around it as an abiding caution against neglect—a trenchant warning that the ideals of America's founders, which have inspired the world, have no earthly hold except in the courage of each generation to protect and maintain a society in which those ideals can flourish.

It will stand, too, but its presence here, as an affirmation that America has accepted Woodrow Wilson's recognition that the task of upholding a civilization based on those ideals—requires of us, in the 20th century and beyond, a commitment to world leadership.

We confront today, in the 20th century's last decade, the monumental challenge of revitalizing our own Nation.

But to meet that challenge, we must bring an equal measure of determination to constructing the kind of new world order envisaged by our 28th President as the century began.

The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to President Wilson in 1919 has, for dec-

ades, been cloaked with tragic irony—a veil we can, at long last, remove by fulfilling his vision.

In our own interest, and mankind's, we must now advance with confidence and resolution on the path of world leadership that Woodrow Wilson recognized as America's great obligation.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

### EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to executive session; that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be discharged from further consideration of nomination of Ritaje H. Butterworth, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation of Public Broadcasting; that the nominee be placed on the executive calendar, and that the Senate then return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senate will resume legislative session.

### DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP ACT

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar 499, S. 2566, the Department of Energy Laboratory Partnership Act; that the Governmental Affairs Committee amendment be agreed to, and the Energy Committee amendments be agreed to; that the bill, as amended, be deemed read the third time and passed, and the motion to reconsider laid upon the table; further that statements relating to this measure be placed in the RECORD at the appropriate place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 2566) to establish partnerships involving Department of Energy laboratories and educational institutions, industry, and other Federal agencies, for purposes of development and application of technologies critical to national security and scientific and technological competitiveness, which had

been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with amendments; as follows:

(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface brackets and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italics.)

S. 2566

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Department of Energy Laboratory Technology Partnership Act of 1992".

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS, PURPOSES, AND DEFINITIONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) the United States Department of Energy has developed excellent scientific and technical capabilities at its laboratories and has assisted in the development of such capabilities at educational institutions with which it has been associated;

(2) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the national security for almost fifty years through nuclear weapons research, development and testing;

(3) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the nation's preeminence in basic research with innovative fundamental and interdisciplinary research programs and national user research facilities;

(4) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the development of energy technologies and other important commercial technologies;

(5) recent domestic and international development make it imperative that the capabilities of the laboratories be strengthened and the interaction of the laboratories with industry and educational institutions be expanded;

(6) the United States must maintain a leadership role in the development and application of technologies that are critical to national security and must exercise a leadership role in the development and application of technologies that are critical to economic prosperity; and

(7) there are formidable challenges facing the United States that the Department's laboratories can address, including—

(A) development of technologies to provide adequate supplies of clean, dependable, and affordable energy;

(B) understanding changes to the environment, especially those associated with energy supply, distribution, and use;

(C) development of improved processes to maintain and manage waste;

(D) promotion of international competitiveness and improvement of the exchange of technology among industry, the academic community, and government; and

(E) the need to facilitate greater application of dual-use military and commercial technologies.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to utilize more effectively the research and development capabilities of departmental laboratories by fostering new partnerships between such laboratories and—

(A) industry, to provide market orientation to the Department's programs and to ensure the timely commercialization of technology;

(B) educational institutions, to provide for mutual benefit from scientific and technological advances and to optimize the use of the facilities of the departmental laboratories; and