example, of the savings and loan industry, wreaking havoc on established responsibilities from one end of the budget to the other. Programs or agencies would not be cut because they failed to produce needed benefits commensurate with their costs, the best test of public policy. Instead, they would be cut because, perhaps, of an increase in oil prices or economic recessions among our trading partners, that could result in a slowdown in our domestic economy. Or, programs could be cut because of a failure in a federally insured program, such as the banking or savings and loan system, or even because of natural disasters such as droughts or floods that create unanticipated demands on available Federal funds. Prohibited from borrowing for unforeseen contingencies, we would disrupt established programs, sacrificing consistent and efficient Government operations for an abstract ideal.

On the other hand, we may choose not to cut spending in response to unforeseen events—including the drop in Government revenues that comes with economic recession. In that case, significant tax increases would be required to meet our obligations. But sizable tax increases in response to large-ly uncontrollable or unforeseeable events would disrupt the plans of citizens and businesses that have a right to expect a stable environment for economic activity.

All economists agree that an uncertain environment weakens the incentive to make the long-term investments our economy must have if we are to meet the demands of the new international economy. Such tax increases would also add an increased burden to our economy in recession, re-enforcing, not counter-balancing, swings in the business cycle.

Finally, Mr. President, a universal practice of State governments is the establishment of agencies with bonding power. Highway and water departments have long enjoyed State budget restrictions has resulted in fragmentation of Government authority among multiple agencies with the power to issue bonds for long-term spending priorities. At the Federal level, this potential response to a balanced budget amendment would mean the proliferation of unelected bureaucracies, further blurring the responsibility for our country's spending and taxing priorities.

Mr. President, whatever my colleagues may believe about the merits of a balanced budget constitutional amendment, I hope our consideration of such proposals will be based on the facts of State budget process and the very real differences between State and Federal responsibilities. A constitutional amendment is a step that should not be taken lightly, or as a matter of venting passing frustration. The questions I have raised today need responsible, credible answers before we take such a profound step.

One of the greatest threats to our long-term economic health and to the efficient functioning of our democratic institutions is our continuing liability to match our spending with our income. But as I mentioned with this issue, particularly as we contemplate the profound step of amending our Constitution, we must seek solutions that accomplish our goals.

Mr. President, there are arguments for a balanced budget amendment that deserve our attention and our careful consideration. But we should not base such an important decision on misunderstood and inappropriate comparisons with State budget practices.

AN AMERICAN AGENDA FOR THE NEW ORDER: ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY D. LAUNCHING AN ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in two previous addresses on the new world order, I began by placing this concept in historical perspective and then proposed a four-part agenda that I believe this Nation must pursue in order to realize the full potential inherent in that momentous phrase.

It is my contention that we must look to history for inspiration in this task: To the vision of Woodrow Wilson and the subsequent achievements of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in laying the groundwork for fulfillment of the Wilsonian vision.

It is, I believe, the duty of this generation of Americans to complete the task that Woodrow Wilson began.

Today, I shall describe the third and fourth parts of America's agenda for a new world order: organizing for collective military security, and launching a worldwide economic-environmental revolution.

In advancing, on a new world order agenda, toward an expanded commitment to the collective use of armed force, where necessary.

We have two, related avenues for progress.

The first avenue involves a new role for NATO: the second, a more regularized exercise of the enforcement power of the United Nations Security Council.

The collapse of the Soviet empire would by itself require that we reexamine NATO's premises; the Atlantic alliance was created to deter a threat that no longer exists.

But this task is given urgency by the endemic violence now scarring the European landscape.

How do we prevent such conflicts?

And how do we respond, should they erupt?

By inviting the former states of the Warsaw Pact into a new North Atlantic cooperation council—the so-called NAC-O.

NATO has wisely moved beyond the cold war to create an all-European consultative body that can play a useful educational and advisory role on matters of security.

But consultation is not enough.

The integrated planning and command structure constitutes an asset unique in the world.

Of all the world's multinational institutions—a veritable alphabet soup—only NATO has the ability to bring coordinated, multinational military force to bear.

But if this asset is to be relevant to post-cold war realities, it must be re-oriented to serve the current security interests of alliance members.

Militarily, NATO has not yet adapted to the post-cold war era. Even as it now develops a new strategy that will accommodate reduced force levels, its military orientation remains unchanged: It remains the defense of allied territory against direct attack.

This military posture is an anachronism.

Instead of tiptoeing toward a revised mandate, NATO should make a great leap forward—by adopting peacekeeping outside NATO territory as a formal alliance mission.

Two steps are essential: First, alliance political leaders must task NATO's military commanders to undertake the requisite preparations in both planning and force reconfiguration, second, alliance members must agree on a new political framework under which forces would be committed.

Ideally, this framework will provide that NATO assets would be used if requested by either of two legitimate political authorities—the U.N. Security Council, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Or should not be NATO's goal to become the world's police force.

But NATO does offer, uniquely, what in some circumstances may be crucial: A core of military forces that can act rapidly, cohesively, and with considerable power.

If NATO can not summon the will and solidarity to perform this function, then the question must soon arise, in this body and among the American people:

What further role is there for the North Atlantic Alliance?

Unfortunately, for some months now, the Bush administration has allowed itself to be diverted by a comparatively petty concern—arising from the initiative of France and Germany to form a small Euro-force.

Over time, military cooperation between these two historic rivals could conceivably provide the core for an independent all-European security force, no longer reliant upon the United States to provide the cement for collective defense.
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But why the Bush administration regards this as an alarming specter can be explained only by postulating that the administration has little concept of historic change.

There are two possibilities: either the Franco-German initiative will fizzle, as have all previous attempts to breathe life into west European security cooperation; or such efforts will finally, in the post-cold war era, bear fruit.

But even if all-European defense cooperation does succeed, it will evolve only slowly—and only as West European leaders and publics reach a conclusion they are not yet even close to reaching: That Europe would be better off relying on Germany and France—without the United States—for leadership in collective defense.

Meanwhile, far more urgent and serious business lies in rendering NATO relevant to real needs in the immediate post-cold-war period.

The United States remains the leader of the alliance and should act like it. A transformation is required, and the Bush administration has not yet supplied the leadership to accomplish it.

In Europe under OSCE auspices, or worldwide under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, NATO forces should henceforth be available for peacekeeping or intervention when either of those political authorities, in which our own voice will be prominent, has reached a collective determination to act.

The second avenue toward expanded readiness for collective military action is to equip the U.N. Security Council to exercise the police and enforcement powers set forth in the U.N. Charter—but rarely used.

Progress on this avenue involves changes in membership and in the availability of forces.

A reordering of the Security Council—the most prestigious and potent of U.N. organs— is necessary because the present structure of permanent membership—America, Britain, France, Russia, and China—reflects the outcome on the battlefield of World War II and is as outdated as NATO's current security posture.

Since then, Japan has become an economic superpower and Germany the dominant power in a unifying European community that did not then even exist.

From a global perspective, these nations, together with the United States, are now the leading powers of the industrialized north.

India, a colony when the second world war ended, is now the world's largest democratic state and with one-sixth of all humanity—the leading voice of the scores of less-developed nations that comprise the south.

The absence of such countries from the organ embodying the U.N.'s most solemn responsibilities has become an unacceptable anomaly in an organization we must seek to empower.

In the 1980's and beyond, economic strength and political leadership will be the currency of power in a world no longer divided by ideology but still plagued by real and pressing problems of security—problems encompassing poverty, demographic growth, migration, disease, environmental degradation, as well as an age-old source: human aggression.

The U.N. Security Council must reflect the reality of world power and the reality of world problems; it must encompass those countries with the resources—both material and human—to address the full range of global security concerns.

Negotiation of membership changes will be arduous; but the clear goal will be to reconcile two objectives:

Enhancing the Security Council's stature through a broadened membership, while avoiding the chronic stalemate that could result from increased participation.

The very process of membership change can also be used to promote an objective central to our new strategy of containing international conflict:

At present, as it happens, the five permanent members of the Security Council are the world's five acknowledged nuclear powers.

Yet nuclear weapons—as the case of the non-defunct Soviet Union demonstrates—confers power in only the most limited sense.

As this permanent membership is broadened to include such non-nuclear states as Japan and Germany—and border-line nuclear states such as India—the delegitimization of nuclear arms should be made a formal and affirmative policy.

The price of new membership on the U.N. Security Council should be an unconditional pledge to remain or become non-nuclear.

With this policy, we accomplish two objectives simultaneously: modernizing the Security Council's membership and further demonetizing nuclear weapons as the currency of international power.

In the case of Japan and Germany, this will entail only the perpetuation of existing policy and treaty commitments. For India, it would mean acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, accepting rigorous international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and giving up an ambiguous status that has, in reality, provided little benefit to that nation and entailed much risk.

The inclusion of Germany, Japan and India as permanent non-nuclear members of the Security Council would validate new conceptions of power in the post-cold war world.

India's membership under the non-nuclear condition would have the additional advantage of ending south Asia's dangerous nuclear arms race, since Pakistan has already agreed to sign the NPT if India will so agree. India's accession to the Security Council would thereby become a catalyst for progress on security problems that have plagued, and squandered the resources, of the Indian subcontinent.

The United States should press for a place in the U.N. commensurate with their size and significance, and the process of reorganization can confirm and uphold larger aims.

Catalyzing this transition will require the good offices—and the sustained leadership—of the United States. Rather than holding back, in the style of the Bush administration, America should initiate this change—

with a sense of magnanimity and purpose befitting the U.N.'s predominant power.

A more pressing need, on which we should act without awaiting the negotiation of membership change, is to further empower the Security Council through the standing availability of military forces.

A remarkable development of recent years—a true precursor of the new world order—is the U.N.'s active and competent role in fostering the settlement of conflicts in Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, El Salvador, and Cambodia.

This momentum in collective action must be sustained, and its purpose widened to include combat interventions where principle and justice warrant.

As well as blue helmets to preside over cease-fires, actual combat units should be at the Security Council's disposal—and not merely on an ad hoc basis where the process of assembling a consensus, followed by troop commitments, may be too slow to meet urgent need.

The coalition-building process that proved successful in the Gulf War does not constitute an adequate paradigm for all interventions the U.N. may deem necessary.

Future crises may require greater speed and determination to create circumstances that do not impose upon the United States the onus either to act unilaterally, or to galvanize a U.N. action in which we supply the preponderance of military power.

It was precisely this preference that Pentagon planners exhibited in the recent strategy document that envisaged, with some relish, the exercise of worldwide American military hegemony in the post-cold war era.

Once leaked, this concept—which I dubbed "America as globo-cop"—was repudiated by the Bush administration as an embarrassment.

But in truth, the unilateralist mindset continues to blind this administration to our new and expensive opportunity to involve other nations more fully and systematically in international security.
To realize the full potential of collective security, we must divert ourselves of the vainglorious dream of a Pax Americana—and look instead for a means to regularize swift, multinational decision and response.

The essence of such an arrangement is not merely to increase the probability of American casualties in combat. It is to ensure that an American initiative does not become an American calamity. To limit the number of American casualties and to prevent American intervention, we would designate a relatively small contingent of American forces—under an article 43 agreement—designated American unit or units—a party.

Article 43 provides that the agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible. But for 47 years that condition was not met: the cold war polarization that beset the United Nations made it impossible for such force commitments to be negotiated.

The agreements envisaged by the U.N. founders—under which nations would designate specific units to be available to the Security Council—have never been made.

The assignment of United States and other forces to the United Nations means only that specifically designated American units—and not necessarily American forces—would be used only in conjunction with other forces—and for a purpose agreed to by the United States as a leading member of the Security Council.

In sum, the assignment to the U.N. Security Council of American and other military units would enhance one valuable instrument of American foreign policy—that is, participation in collective military action. Without it, the American Armed Forces would become a disproportionate burden in collective security, as the experience of article 43 commitments by the United States and other powers has shown.

In the last two weeks, Western nations—under whose aegis the armed forces of the U.N. Security Council have been deployed under article 43, armed forces...necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Thus, by designating a relatively small contingent of American forces, we would draw other nations into obligations of military responsibility.

Enactment of the collective security participation resolution, while not necessary as a matter of legal technicality, would be valuable as a matter of political reality. The resolution—beginning with the Korean war and extending through the Vietnam war to the Gulf war—we have engaged in an agonizing constitutional struggle over the war power.

Against that background of chronic dispute, in which I myself have been a dedicated participant, I believe it important that the Congress of today render a modern affirmation concerning the war power. By endorsing a principle of collective security—and the mechanism to carry it out—that the founders of the United Nations and the Congress of 1945 were prepared to affirm nearly half a century ago.

The potential value of enhanced institutional preparedness for collective military action is underscored by the ongoing disaster in Yugoslavia.

For four decades—beginning with the Korean war and extending through the Vietnam war—nations have deliberated on the tactics of whether and when to recognize the former Yugoslav Republics as they declared independence. But this disagreement—has now been replaced by common horror at the wanton brutality inflicted by Serbian forces.

The ONE Security Council or the CSCE adequately equipped, both by political disposition and the readiness of military forces, the question of intervention could now be addressed on its merits, without the impediment of massive institutional complexity.

The question of intervention in Yugoslavia instructs us: If our multinational bodies are to act when needed, we must first prepare them to act.

If we are to find any gain from the tragedy of Yugoslavia, it must be in the momentum it provides in moving us more swiftly down both paths of expanded commitment to collective military action—the formal adoption by NATO of a peacekeeping and intervention role, and a more formal commitment by key U.N. members to military action under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.
Just as Neville Chamberlain’s trip to Munich in 1938 stands as a permanent warning of the futility of appeasement, the unabated slaughter in Bosnia offers a new lesson: If we do not prepare for collective action, the end of the cold war could usher in not a new world order but an era of endless interethic bloodletting.

American leadership to achieve this expanded commitment to collective security will serve, together a new strategy of weapons containment, to complete the military dimension of our new world order agenda.

The fourth part of America’s agenda for a new world order encompasses all we must do in the Herculean task of sustaining and broadening mankind’s prosperity while preserving the global environment.

The two elements of this task are related: first, to maintain and further perfect the system of open world trade; second, to infuse this system with revolutionary new priorities—developmental and environmental—reflecting the global opportunities and perils we clearly foresee already in the 1990’s and beyond.

The world system of free trade—though we have come to take it for granted, perceiving mainly its flaws—is among the salient achievements of the postwar era, embodying a lesson learned harshly during the downward spiral of protectionism in the 1930’s.

America’s bedrock economic task today, as the world’s leader and leading trader, is to preserve this system and mold it wisely, as the key to prosperity for ourselves and our allies and as the lifeline for growth in the developing world.

This task centers on the most ambitious trade negotiations ever undertaken: the current phase of GATT talks, known as the Uruguay round.

Trade experts project that, if successful, the Uruguay round will increase worldwide trade and by trade liberalization over the next decade. That equates to $500 billion per year, or $100 annually for every man, woman, and child on the planet.

The aim in these negotiations—in defense of United States interests as well as broader principles—is to open new markets to American producers and to American service industries such as banking and insurance.

This objective entails the continuing toll of determined diplomacy—to identify and eliminate unfair trade practices, whether they be discriminatory barriers to our exports or services, or illegal subsidies to foreign goods competing with our own.

The highest American priority is the domestic market of Japan. In the GATT and in direct bilateral negotiations that must be as candid as may prove necessary, we must weed out the welter of nontariff barriers facing Americans and others who wish to export to a large Japanese market that is permeated with impediments to penetration.

A priority only slightly subordinate is the European Community. There we must continue to fight the excessive barriers and subsidies that protect and over-incentivize European agriculture; and we must ensure that the final stage of economic unification—the internal tariff elimination and regulatory harmonization known as EC-92—does not yield, in any industry, a “fortress Europe” impenetrable to those outside.

A GATT objective of longer-term priority is to incorporate the emerging nations of the former Soviet empire fully into the GATT system, thereby opening Western markets to their products and quickening the pace of Western investment in their industries.

Our simultaneous task, in continuing to open markets, is to complete work on a regional trade pact—the North American Free-Trade Agreement—that would create our own common market with Canada and Mexico.

All these parties can gain—but only with stipulations on Mexican wage rates and environmental standards that ensure against a rush of northern industry to the south.

No principle of efficiency would be served by abetting the rise of a low-wage pollution belt across the Mexican border.

Soundly conducted, these trade negotiations can benefit the United States and all other parties at once—a philosophy the Bush administration correctly affirms.

Where danger lies is in the Bush administration’s excessive dedication to the principle of laissez-faire. Not only is the administration committed to noninterference in the world trade, it has exhibited precisely the same ideological commitment to noninterference in the full range of issues in American diplomacy that it has been applying directly on improving American competitiveness in the free trade system.

A principle wisely applied in one realm has yielded a vacuum of leadership in another, and the two do not stand alone. Free trade is dependent on public support for free trade, and public support for free trade is dependent on public confidence in free trade.

Today the American people have grown acutely aware of the decline in our educational standards, our industries, and our cities, and they discern quite clearly that the Bush administration lacks any strategic plan whatsoever; either to correct these deficiencies—or to promote American competitiveness in the world economy in the years ahead.

We have national deficits in budget and trade; we have a national deficit in research, infrastructure, and human capital—and we have a national deficit in leadership to correct these fundamental shortcomings that are propelling us into a downward spiral.

By failing to inspire any confidence among the American people that our country will remain adequately competitive in the post-cold war period, and indeed by pandering to fears that it may not, the Bush administration has undermined American public support for the free trade system.

Until American confidence, American competitiveness, and American trade balance are restored, not only will the United States remain in jeopardy as a stable society; so too will a global system of free trade that depends upon American leadership. But the Bush administration’s pervasive laissez-faire philosophy—perhaps better described as pervasive inaction—is a liability not simply in maintaining open world trade.

More injurious still is the administration’s determined resistance to performing America’s crucial leadership role in reorienting world production and trade—to meet developmental and environmental needs that are intrinsic to America’s future and all of mankind’s.

The hazards of the Bush administration’s abdication of world leadership were on vivid display last month at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Developing the Earth summit—in Rio de Janeiro.

The issues in Rio were as broad as this administration’s horizons are narrow: the effect of man on Earth, and the ability of man to rescue himself from the adverse consequences of his own creativity—and fecundity.

Through the centuries, both religion and hope have led us to expect that the marvelous web of life—the interaction of living beings with land, air, and water—is infinitely resilient and immune to the meager actions of man. This comforting myth has been shattered forever.

A new truth now—and citizens of the world are beginning to understand—that mankind rivals the great forces of nature as an agent of global change. A great realization has dawned worldwide that manmade changes, in their aggregate, are profoundly perilous for man himself.

The President, and his apologists take refuge in the contention that the ambiguities of scientific evidence render predictions uncertain. But as the world’s leaders gathered in Rio we were quick to understand, the President’s sophistry was a mask for his courting of domestic corporate and ideological interests: Corporate interests averse to the very idea of environmental rules, and ideological interests possessed of a visceral disdain for their own countrymen, and others in the world, called environmentalists.

The Environment Minister of Germany put it candidly in stating that the Bush administration, in its search for a new world order encompassed all we must do in the Herculean task of sustaining and broadening mankind’s prosperity while preserving the global environment.

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Someday they will end—the only question is how.

Will they end through man’s rational containment and redirection of his own activities? Or will they end in human catastrophe beyond our current imagination—a question under discussion in Rio de Janeiro—in an unprecedented global forum that constituted the largest assemblage of world leaders in human history.

To this assemblage the Bush administration brought little but braggadocio and contempt. In Rio, the President of the United States uttered two truths—but both in a perverse context. His presentation gave new meaning to a century-old observation by William James, the venerable American philosopher: “There is no worse lie,” said James, “than a truth misunderstood.”

The great linkage under discussion in Rio—explicit in the name of the Conference and implicit in all that was said—is the connection between world development and the environment.

The unifying principle is sustainability: the imperative that future economic growth in all countries be conducted in a manner that can be sustained within limits imposed by the Earth’s environment. This imperative derives from truths that are not under scientific dispute and cannot be dismissed even by the most irresponsible political leaders:

The Earth’s population, which has doubled in my lifetime, will double again in the lifetime of my children. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth’s forests, great engines of the biosphere and bounteous as sanctuaries for plant and animal life of incalculable value, and fast disappearing. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth’s oceans are rapidly becoming death traps for developing countries as the ceaseless flow of human garbage that is poisoning all sea-life, and fish not yet poisoned are being harvested from the seas more quickly than they can reproduce. These trends cannot be sustained.

The Earth’s aqueous supply, fresh water, only one drop for each gallon of salt water and crucial to man and many other species, is declining. This trend cannot be sustained.

The Earth’s diversity of life—animal and plant life in its multitudinous forms—is being extinguished at a rate that will see the disappearance of one-fourth of all species within the next 40 years. This trend cannot be sustained.

The stratosphere above the Earth continues to accumulate tons of man-made carbon gases that will inevitably, and perhaps disastrously, affect the environment and climate. This trend cannot be sustained.

These trends appear inexorable, but they are not.

A common and pertinent observation about the Rio Conference was the failure of the conferees to come to grips with the overwhelming issue of world population. The reasons for this are not obscure and reflect genuine political impediments rather than hypocrisy.

Although all concerned recognize the burgeoning of human numbers as a fundamental source of global poverty and environmental degradation, efforts to limit population growth run afoul—as Americans themselves are well aware—of deep-seated religious, cultural, and ideological belief.

What cannot be disputed is the inevitability of dramatic change in human patterns of procreation in the decades ahead. This will occur in one of three ways: As a result of catastrophe involving enormous misery, through Draconian measures imposed by societies, or—the one palatable possibility—by a voluntary change in human behavior.

By all past evidence of human conduct, a noncoercive behavior change—a voluntary stabilization of human numbers—occurs only in societies that are developed. Whereas poverty yields multiplying numbers as families try to grow to survive, prosperity yields population stability. Therefore, the single scenario not horrible to contemplate entails development as the key to limiting the inexorable growth in global population.

But if economies must grow in order for populations to stabilize, the necessity of an economic-environmental revolution is underscored, for if the billions of people in the Third World follow the development path of the millions in the first world, emulating our patterns of resource exploitation and pollution, the Earth will fast approach the threshold of uninhability.

Thus, the question of population carries us back immediately to the necessity of sustainable economic growth and the environmental concerns that go with it.

In assessing the Bush administration’s debacle in Rio, historians are likely to conclude what already seems apparent—that the blunder was both tactical and strategic.

Tactically, there was little need for the administration’s negativity on the two major treaties awaiting signature.

The treaty the President insisted on weakening—designed to protect the global climate through limits on the emission of greenhouse gases—contains targets and timetables that the United States is very likely to meet even without a treaty obligation.

Thus, the President’s achievement in eliminating obligatory targets and timetables consisted primarily in relieving all other nations of what would have been a strict and immensely valuable commitment.

Similarly, on the treaty designed to slow the extinction of diverse animal
and plant life, there was scant need on the merits for the President's ostenta-
tious refusal to sign.

The treaty's pledge to support bio-
diversity-and its mandate that tech-
nology companies share the pro-
cedents of genetic wealth with the coun-
tries in which they find it, was suffi-
ciently flexible that all other major
nations found it possible to join. Only
the United States, with its White
House plainly in search of an us versus
failure in Rio de Janeiro was even more
pronounced.

The climate and biodiversity treaties
will go into effect, and eventually a
more enlightened administration will
seek to recover the ground lost by
President Bush in Rio.

But in the meantime, the President
will have foregone a singular oppor-
tunity—not only to help reorient the
world economy but also to educate the
American people as to a new and prom-
ising role they may play within it.

The President wished to convey to
his political constituency that he was,
effect, saving the American econom-
y from an unpleasant dose of castor
oil.

But in truth—a truth the American
people are fully capable of grasping—
environmentally sound technology
holds great promise for the American
economy.

There is, first, the underlying prin-
ciple that the adoption of more energy-
efficient technologies will eventually
render all American industry more
competitive.

But beyond that principle is the vast
industry of environmental technology
itself—technology in which the United
States is already a world leader.

As the world makes its necessary
turn toward the use of such tech-
nology, America is well positioned to
dominate this exponentially expanding
global market.

But in Europe alone, the market,
for environmental services in which
the United States is a world leader—air
pollution control, water treatment,
waste management, and ground decon-
tamination—is expected to approach
$200 billion per year within this decade.

Already, European industries in need
of services are turning to American
firms that have established themselves
on this technology's cutting edge.

A visionary American President
would not be rejecting the advent of an
economic-environmental revolution.

He would be promoting the revolu-
tion, as a world need and an American
economic opportunity.

In allowing himself to be eclipsed at
the Earth summit, even by allied lead-
ers who tried not to do so, the President
seemed oblivious to the competitive
implications of this global revolution
for which the Earth summit will be the
launching pad, with or without the
Bush administration.

When the Japanese Government
pledged generous levels of global envi-
ronmental assistance, did the Presi-
dent comprehend that this pledge not
only boosted Japan's diplomatic stature—
but that the assistance itself will
boost Japanese industries in competi-
tion with our own for an enormously
lucrative global market?

In contrast to the President's
scraped-back view of environmentalism, the American
people must take the broadest possible
view, recognizing that the needs of the
future environmentally can be the
wave of the future economically.

For the United States, it should be-
come a paramount priority, pervading
all future trade and assistance policy,
to promote American environmental
technologies and services around the
world.

To that end, I will introduce the En-
vironmental Aid and Trade Act—legis-
lation designed to establish this priori-
ty in the organizational structure, and
actions, of every Federal agency in-
volved in U.S. trade and aid: the De-
artment of Commerce, the Agency for
International Development, the Trade
and Development program, the Export-
Import Bank, and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation.

Our own prosperity and environment,
and the world's will be the bene-
ficiaries of such a concerted American
strategy.

By no means does an emphasis on
technology suggest that current plan-
etary trends are susceptible to an easy
fix.

As human numbers explode, pressing
hard already against earthly limits, we
have every reason to be sober.

In the face of current global statis-
tics and projections, even an inveterate
optimist could easily conclude that our
own generation, or at best our chil-
dren's, will be the last on this planet to
enjoy the natural magnificence—and
mutilation—we have known.

But if we are to choose between
optimism and pessimism—in what we
must begin to regard as a race to save our
planet.

What is necessary is to choose action
over denial.

Only a fool—or a national leadership
out of touch with all reality—could be
persuaded that these problems will
solve themselves.

At this moment of deep disappoint-
ment among many Americans—an
overall disappointment at the failure
of their national leadership and a spe-
cific disappointment at the President's
abject failure to lead at a world sum-
mit of historic import—Americans may
find value in the words of one of their
great authors.

As William Faulkner accepted the
1950 Nobel Prize for literature, just as
America had assumed world leadership
of a renewed quest for Wilsonian co-
operation, he spoke of the ultimate
fate of mankind:

"It is easy enough to say that man is im-
mortal simply because he will endure.

That when the last diners of doom has
collapsed and faded to the roar of
rock hanging lifeless in the last red
and dying evening.

But even then there will still be one more
sound: That of his puny inexhaustible voice,
still talking.

Willing to accept this, I believe that man
will not merely endure: He will prevail.

He is immortal, not because he alone
among creatures has an inexhaustible voice,
but because he has a peculiarly trans-
required if America is now to fulfill the role history offers.

As we look back on the century now ending, and all of its dazzling change, we see three events to which I would attach surprising significance: the great war, the Holocaust, and the collapse of the totalitarian idea. These events shattered what the Austrian dramatist and philosopher Stefan Zweig, called "the world of yesterday"—but opened new horizons for democracy and collective responsibility.

The Holocaust, wrought by the deadly combination of human evil and human neglect, demonstrated the bottomless horror into which mankind might fall if it failed to accept the challenge—and realize the opportunities—to which Woodrow Wilson had given eloquent voice.

Now, as the century nears its close, the near-universal repudiation of the totalitarian idea has removed the last great obstacle to the Wilsonian vision.

The paramount question facing us today, as Americans in an interdependent world, is whether we will seize our opportunity—or fall prey again to the same lapse of vision, judgment, and will to which this Nation succumbed some 70 years ago.

Next year a new memorial—the Holocaust Memorial Museum—will open in our Nation's Capital. It is rising now, just across the Tidal Basin from the sublimely beautiful memorial to the author of the Declaration of Independence—and just steps from the great obelisk honoring our first President.

Some will question why the Mall in Washington should be the site for the formal remembrance of a barbarian half a world away.

For me there is a good answer.

This new memorial will join with those around it as an abiding caution against neglect—a trenchant warning that the ideals of America's founders, which have inspired the world, have no earthly hold except in the courage of each generation to protect and maintain a society in which those ideals can flourish.

It will stand, too, but its presence here, as an affirmation that America has accepted Woodrow Wilson's recognition that the task of upholding a civilization based on those ideals—requires of us, in the 20th century and beyond, a commitment to world leadership.

We confront today, in the 20th century's last decade, the monumental challenge of revitalizing our own Nation's Capital.

But to meet that challenge, we must bring an equal measure of determination to constructing the kind of new world order envisaged by our 28th President as the century began.

The Prize awarded to President Wilson in 1919 has, for decades, been cloaked with tragic irony—a veil we can, at long last, remove by fulfilling his vision.

In our own interest, and mankind's, we must now advance with confidence and resolution on the path of world leadership that Woodrow Wilson recognized as America's great obligation.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to executive session; that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be discharged from further consideration of nomination of Rita Jean H. Butterworth, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation of Public Broadcasting; that the nominee be placed on the executive calendar, and that the Senate then return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senate will resume legislative session.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP ACT

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar 499, S. 2566, the Department of Energy Laboratory Partnership Act; that the Governmental Affairs Committee amendment be agreed to, and the Energy Committee amendments be agreed to; that the bill, as amended, be deemed read the third time and passed, and the motion to reconsider laid upon the table; further that statements relating to this measure be placed in the Record at the appropriate place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 2566), an act establishing partnerships involving Department of Energy laboratories and educational institutions, industry, and other Federal agencies, for purposes of development and application of technologies critical to national security and scientific and technological competitiveness, which had been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with amendments; as follows:

The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface brackets and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italics.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Department of Energy Laboratory Technology Partnership Act of 1992."

SEC. 2. FINDINGS, PURPOSES, AND DEFINITIONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) the United States Department of Energy has developed excellent scientific and technical capabilities at its facilities and has assisted in the development of such capabilities at educational institutions with which it has been associated;

(2) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the national security for almost fifty years through nuclear weapons research, development and testing;

(3) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the development of energy technologies and other important commercial technologies;

(4) the Department's laboratories have contributed significantly to the development of energy technologies and other important commercial technologies;

(5) recent domestic and international developments make it imperative that the capabilities of the laboratories be strengthened and the interaction of the laboratories with industry and educational institutions be expanded;

(6) the United States must maintain a leadership role in the development and application of technologies that are critical to economic prosperity and national security and must exercise a leadership role in the development and application of technologies that are critical to economic prosperity;

(7) there are formidable challenges facing the United States that the Department's laboratories can address, including—

(A) development of technologies to provide adequate supplies of clean, dependable, and affordable energy;

(B) understanding changes to the environment, especially those associated with energy supply, distribution, and use;

(C) development of improved processes to maintain and manage waste;

(D) promotion of international competitiveness and improvement of the exchange of technology among industry, the academic community, and government;

(E) the need to facilitate greater application of dual-use military and commercial technologies.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to utilize more effectively the research and development capabilities of departmental laboratories by fostering new partnerships between such laboratories and—

(A) industry, to provide market orientation to the Department's programs and to ensure the timely commercialization of technology;

(B) educational institutions, to provide for mutual benefit from scientific and technological advances and to optimize the use of the facilities of the departmental laboratories;