

US Department of State

**Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992**

Title:

**The United Nations: Forging A Genuine Global
Community**

Bush

Source: President Bush

Description: Address before the UN General Assembly, New York City

Date: Sep, 21 1992/21/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: MidEast/North Africa, E/C Europe,
Subsaharan Africa

Country: USSR (former), Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Cyprus, Croatia,
Cambodia, Lebanon

Subject: United Nations, Democratization, Arms Control, NATO,
CSCE, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Trade/Economics

[TEXT]

Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, and distinguished guests. Forty-seven years ago, I was a young man of 21, and, like thousands of others of my generation, I'd gone off to war to help keep freedom alive. But 47 years ago this month, the war was finally over, and I was looking forward to peace and the chance to begin my life in earnest. Nineteen forty-five marked a moment of promise, not just for me but for all of mankind. A great struggle against dictatorship had been fought and won.

Across the globe, we all looked forward to a future free of war, a world where we might raise our children in peace and freedom. And this institution, the United Nations, born amidst the ashes of war, embodied those hopes and dreams like no other.

But the hopes and dreams [of] 1945 remained unfulfilled. Communist imperialism divided the world in two; our hopes for peace and our dreams of freedom were frozen in the grip of [the] Cold War. Instead of finding a common ground, we found ourselves at ground zero. Instead of living on Churchill's broad, sunlit uplands, millions found that there was, as Arthur Koestler so chillingly wrote, darkness at noon. And instead of uniting the nations, this body became a forum for distrust and division among nations. In a cruel irony, the United Nations, created to free the world of conflict,

became itself conflict's captive.

I, too, lived through those disputes. I sat where you sit, proudly so, served in this assembly. I saw in my time the consequences of the Cold War's hot words on the higher missions of the United Nations. Now, 47 years later, we stand at the end of another war, the Cold War, and our hopes and dreams have awakened again.

Driven by its own internal contradictions and banished by the people's undying thirst for freedom, imperial communism has collapsed in its birthplace. Today, Russia has awakened--democratic, independent, and free. The Baltic states are free; and so, too, are Ukraine and Armenia and Belarus, and Kazakhstan and the other independent states joining the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in freedom.

The fear of nuclear Armageddon between the superpowers has vanished. We are proud to have done our part to ensure that our schoolchildren do not have to practice hiding under their desks for fear of nuclear attack as the generation before them.

And I am proud, also, to salute the courageous leaders with nuclear responsibilities--Presidents Yeltsin [Russia], Kravchuk [Ukraine], Nazarbaev [Kazakhstan], Shushkevich [Belarus]--who join me in ending the superpower standoff that risked nuclear nightmare. This is the first General Assembly to seat you as truly independent and free nations. To you and the leaders of the other independent states, I say: Welcome home; we are now truly United Nations.

With the Cold War's end, I believe we have a unique opportunity to go beyond artificial divisions of a first, second, and third world to forge, instead, a genuine global community of free and sovereign nations--a community built on respect for principle, of peaceful settlements of disputes, fundamental human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom: democracy and free markets.

Already the United Nations, especially the Security Council, has done much to fulfill its original mission and to build this global community. UN leadership has been critical in resolving conflicts and brokering peace the entire world over. But securing democracy and securing the peace in the century ahead will be no simple task. Imperial communism may have been vanquished, but that does not end the challenges of our age--challenges that must be overcome, if we are finally to end the divisions between east and west, north and south that fuel strife and strain and conflict and war.

As we support the historic growth of democracy around the world, I believe the community of nations and the United Nations face three critical, interrelated challenges as we enter the 21st century:

First, we face the political challenge of keeping today's peace and preventing tomorrow's wars. As we see daily in Bosnia and Somalia and Cambodia, everywhere [that] conflict claims innocent lives, the need for enhanced peace-keeping capabilities has never been greater, the conflicts we deal with more intractable, the costs of conflict higher.

Second, we face the strategic challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--truly the fastest growing security challenge to international peace and order.

And, third, we face the common economic challenge of promoting prosperity for all, of strengthening an open, growth-oriented, free-market international economic order while safeguarding the environment.

Meeting these challenges will require us to strengthen our collective engagement. It will require us to transform our collective institutions.

And, above all, it will require that each of us look seriously at our own governments and how we conduct our international affairs. We, too, must change our institutions and our practices if we are to make a new world of the promise of today, if we're to secure a 21st century peace.

With you, today, I would like to discuss these three challenges--peace-keeping, proliferation, and prosperity. I'd like to use this opportunity to begin to sketch how I believe the international community can work together to meet these three challenges and how the United States is changing its institutions and policies to catalyze this effort.

Let me begin with peace-keeping. The United Nations has a long and distinguished history of peace-keeping and humanitarian relief. From Cyprus and Lebanon to Cambodia and Croatia, the blue beret has become a symbol of hope amid all that hostility. The United Nations has long played a central role in preventing conflicts from turning into wars, and strengthened peace-keeping capabilities can help buttress these diplomatic efforts.

But, as much as the United Nations has done, it can do much more. Peacekeepers are stretched to the limit, while demands for their services increase by the day. The need for monitoring and preventive peace-keeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become especially critical in volatile regions. This is especially the case because of the rapid and turbulent change that continues to shake Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Across the lands that once were imprisoned behind an Iron Curtain, peoples are reasserting their historical identities that were frozen in communism's catacomb. Where this is taking place in a democratic manner with tolerance and civility and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, this new democratic nationalism is all to the good.

But, unfortunately, we need only look to the bloody battles raging in places such as the former Yugoslavia to see the dangers of ethnic violence. This is the greatest threat to the democratic peace we hope to build with Eastern Europe, with Russia and Eurasia, even more so than economic deprivation.

We fully support the efforts of NATO and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and WEU [Western European Union], the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and other competent regional organizations to develop peace-keeping capabilities. We are convinced that enhanced UN capabilities, however, are a necessary complement to these regional efforts, not just in Europe and Eurasia but across the globe.

I welcome the Secretary General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the United Nations' ability to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict across the globe. Today, I call upon all members to join me in taking bold steps to advance that agenda. I, therefore, will be discussing with my colleagues the merits of a special meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the Secretary General's proposals and to develop concrete responses in five key areas.

1. Robust peace-keeping requires men and equipment that only member states can provide. Nations should develop and train military units for possible peace-keeping operations and humanitarian relief. These forces must be available on short notice at the request of the Security Council and with the approval, of course, of the governments providing them.

2. If multinational units are to work together, they must train together. Many nations--for example, Fiji, Norway, Canada, and Finland--have a long history of peace-keeping. We can all tap into that experience as we train for expanded operations. Effective multinational action will also require coordinated command-and-control and interoperability of both equipment

and communications. Multinational planning, training, [and] field exercises will be needed. These efforts should link up with regional organizations.

3. We also need to provide adequate logistical support for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Member states should designate stockpiles of resources necessary to meet humanitarian emergencies, including famines, floods, [and] civil disturbances. This will save valuable time in a crisis.

4. We will need to develop planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.

5. We must ensure adequate, equitable financing for UN and associated peace-keeping efforts.

As I said, we must change our national institutions if we are to change our international relations. So let me assure you: The United States is ready to do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peace-keeping.

For decades, the American military has served as a stabilizing presence around the globe. I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the peace to support UN peace-keeping.

I have directed the US Secretary of Defense [Richard Cheney] to place a new emphasis on peace-keeping. Because of peace-keeping's growing importance as a mission for the US military, we will emphasize training of combat, engineering, and logistical units for the full range of peace-keeping and humanitarian activities.

We will work with the United Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities to support peace-keeping operations. We will offer our capabilities for joint simulations and exercises to strengthen our ability to undertake joint peace-keeping operations. There is room for all countries, large and small, and I hope all will play a part.

Member states, as always, must retain the final decision on the use of their troops, of course. But we must develop our ability to coordinate peace-keeping efforts so that we can mobilize quickly when a threat to peace arises or when people in need look to the world for help.

I have further directed the establishment of a permanent peace-keeping curriculum in US military schools. Training, plainly, is key. The United States is prepared to make available our bases and facilities for multinational training and field exercises. One such base, nearby, with facilities is Fort Dix. America used these bases to win the Cold War. And, today, with that war over, they can help build a lasting peace.

The United States is willing to provide our military expertise to the United Nations to help the UN strengthen its planning and operations for peace-keeping. We will also broaden American support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements of UN peace-keeping or humanitarian assistance operations.

And, finally, the United States will review how we fund peace-keeping and explore new ways to ensure adequate American financial support for UN peace-keeping and UN humanitarian activities. I do believe that we must think differently about how we ensure and pay for our security in this new era.

While the end of the Cold War may have ended the superpower nuclear arms competition, regional competition [and] weapons of mass destruction continue. Over 20 countries have or are developing nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapons and the means to deliver them. At a time when the United States and its former adversaries are engaged in deep, historic cuts in our nuclear arsenals, our children and grandchildren will never forgive us if we allow new and unstable nuclear standoffs to develop around the world.

We believe the Security Council should become a key forum for non-proliferation enforcement. The Security Council should make clear its intention to stem proliferation and sanction proliferators. Reaffirming assurances made at the time the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] was negotiated, I proposed that the Security Council reassure the non-nuclear states that it will seek immediate action to provide assistance in accordance with the charter to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.

I also call for the indefinite renewal of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty when it is reviewed in 1995. I believe we must explore ways that we can strengthen linkages between these suppliers' clubs, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, and specialized UN agencies. Here, I would like to note UNSCOM's [UN Security Council Observer's Mission in Iraq] productive efforts to dismantle the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program and the International Atomic Energy Agency's continuing good work.

But as the UN organizations adapt to stop proliferation, so, too, must every member state change its structures to advance our non-proliferation goals.

In that spirit, I want to announce my intention, today, to work with the US Congress to redirect the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--known to some of you as ACDA--to refocus its talents on providing technical support for non-proliferation, weapons monitoring and destruction, and global defense conversion.

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, ACDA should be used not only in completing the traditional arms control agenda but, just as importantly, in providing technical assistance on our new security agenda,

Even as we work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we must be realistic and guard ourselves against proliferation that has already taken place. And, therefore, we're working toward a cooperative system for defense against limited ballistic missile attacks. We fully intend to have other nations participate in this global protection system.

While expanded peace-keeping capabilities and improved non-proliferation efforts will be critical for building an enduring peace, shared economic growth is the long-term foundation for a brighter future, well into the next century. That's why I stated yesterday, during a moment of international uncertainty, that the United States would be strongly engaged with its global partners in building a global economic, financial, and trading structure for this new era. At the same time, I urged that our global responsibilities lead us to examine ways to strengthen the G-7 [Group of Seven industrialized nations] coordination process. I affirmed America's support for European integration that opens markets and enhances Europe's capability to be our partner in the great challenges that we face in this new era.

While the exact form of integration is, of course, for Europeans to determine, we will stand by them. Economic growth is not a zero-sum process. All of us will benefit from the expanded trade and investment that comes from a vibrant, growing world economy.

To ensure that the benefits of this growth are sustained and shared by all, fair and open competition should be the fuel for the global economic engine. That's why the United States wants to complete the Uruguay Round of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations as soon as

possible and to create a network of free trade agreements beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement. At the same time, we need to recognize that we have a shared responsibility to foster and support the free market reforms necessary to build growing economies and vibrant democracies in the developing world and in the new democratic states. This should be done by promoting the private sector to build these new economies, not by fostering dependency with traditional government-to-government foreign aid.

Since World War II, foreign assistance often served as a weapon in the Cold War. Obviously, we will still use critical foreign assistance funds to meet legitimate security needs. As our humanitarian operations in Somalia and northern Iraq, Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union will testify, we will continue our robust humanitarian assistance efforts to help those suffering from man-made and natural disasters.

But foreign aid, as we've known it, needs to be transformed. The notion of the handout to less-developed countries needs to give way to cooperation in mutually productive economic relationships. We know that the more a nation relies on the private sector and free markets, the higher its rate of growth. The more open to trade, the higher its rate of growth. And the better a country's investment climate, the higher its rate of growth.

To move from aid--what I would call "aid dependency"--to economic partnership, we propose to alter fundamentally the focus of US assistance programs to building strong, independent economies that can become contributors to a healthy, growing global economy.

Now, that means that our new emphasis should be on building economic partnership among our private sectors that will promote prosperity at home and abroad, also. Working with our Congress, I will propose a top-to-bottom overhaul of our institutions that plan and administer foreign assistance, drastically reducing the bureaucracy that has built up around government-based programs, streamlining our delivery systems, and strengthening support for private sector development and economic reform.

The Agency for International Development--USAID--another institution born during the Cold War, needs to be fundamentally and radically overhauled. Promoting economic security, opportunity, and competitiveness will become a primary mission of the State Department.

Our assistance efforts should not be charity. On the contrary, they should promote mutual prosperity. Therefore, using existing foreign affairs resources, I will propose creating a \$1-billion growth fund. The fund will provide grants and credits to support US businesses in providing expertise, goods, and services desperately needed in countries undertaking economic restructuring.

I will also support significantly increasing the programs of the Export-Import Bank to ensure that US products and technology promote investment in worldwide economic growth. The United States will work with its global partners, especially the G-7 nations, to enhance global growth at this key point in world history as we end one era and begin another. None of us can afford insular policies. Each of us must contribute through greater coordinated action to build a stronger world economy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I realize that what I've outlined today is an ambitious agenda. But we live in remarkable times--times when empires collapse, ideologies dissolve, and walls crumble; times when change can come so fast that we sometimes forget how far and how fast we've progressed in achieving our hopes for a global community of democratic nations.

In the face of today's changes, with the loss of so much that was familiar and predictable, there is now a great temptation for people everywhere to turn inward and to build walls around themselves--walls against trade,

walls against people, walls against ideas and investment, walls against anything at all that appears new and different.

As the Berlin Wall fell, these walls, too, must fall. They must fall because we cannot separate our fate from that of others. Our peace is so interconnected, our security so intertwined, our prosperity so interdependent, that to turn inward and retreat from the world is to invite disaster and defeat. At the threshold of a new century we can truly say [that] a more peaceful, more secure, more prospering future beckons to us. For the sake of our children and our grandchildren; for the sake of those who perished during the Cold War; and for the sake of every man, woman, and child who kept freedom's flame alive even during the darkest noon, let us pledge ourselves to make that future real. Let us pledge ourselves to fulfill the promise of a truly United Nations. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

Global Economic Coordination

Bush

Source: President Bush

Description: Address before finance ministers and central bank governors, the White House, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 20 1992/20/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: Whole World

Subject: Trade/Economics

[TEXT]

(introductory and closing remarks deleted)

Given the important events in Europe this week--in particular, the turmoil in the financial markets and the vote in France on the European Community's Maastricht Treaty--I believe it is important for me to share with you my views. And together, we must establish an international economic system that meets the demands of the post-Cold War era.

While the topics may be complex, they affect the day-to-day life of all of our citizens--the interest rates they pay on mortgages; inflation that can eat away at pensions; trade and, then, growth that creates jobs.

First and foremost, I want to assure you of the US commitment to be strongly engaged in a positive, steady fashion to help build global prosperity. I am working to strengthen America to compete with you, not retreat from you.

Next, I want to affirm our country's support for a European integration that opens markets and, in the process, enhances Europe's capability to be our partner in the great challenges we face in this new era. The exact form of

integration is, of course, for our partners to determine. And we will stand with them as they do so.

Over recent years, we've been largely successful in returning to a regime of price stability. And this stability will enable our entrepreneurs, our businesses, [and] our workers to concentrate on building new technologies, real productive assets, savings, and jobs. We must combine this price stability with more vigorous economic growth. And, therefore, we must examine ways to strengthen our international economic and monetary systems further--not only in Europe, which is experiencing exchange rate instability at the moment, but in the global economy.

And in this context, I believe it is important in the months ahead for the G-7 [Group of Seven industrialized countries] nations--the United States, our European partners, Canada, and Japan--to enhance the efforts we made in the past to review our economic policies and strengthen our economic coordination process. The aim of the coordination process in this new era should be to promote a healthy and progressive world economy and a stable monetary system.

I believe the political leadership of our nations will need to play an increasingly active role in this work by reviewing our different economic perspectives and reinforcing possible agreements.

In seeking to strengthen the coordination process over the longer term, the United States will advocate to our economic partners that we explore the development of an independent reference point for our multilateral surveillance process.

We believe it could be useful in strengthening the coordination process to more intensely utilize an economic indicator that compares the relation among our currency and a basket of commodities, including gold. This commodity price indicator should be used in conjunction with other measures of economic performance, such as growth, exchange rates, [and] external imbalances as we work to coordinate our economic policies.

Finally, the United States also pledges its full commitment to policies that will strengthen the fundamentals for sustainable long-term growth. That includes a successful Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT] to expand world trade for all market economies, old and new. No politics of this country, let me just assure you, will interfere with our efforts for the US side to conclude a successful--[for] the successful conclusion of the GATT round.

It also includes limits on the growth of our mandatory spending programs here in this country so that we can reduce our deficits. And it includes an effort to dismantle internal rigidities that obstruct the creative process of building new businesses, helping people to develop new skills, and shifting capital to investments where it will contribute to greater growth.

Over the past few years, we have succeeded beyond our greatest expectations in offering hundreds of millions of free people the opportunity to build a secure economic future. But the very scope of the change has left all our publics uncertain, anxious about the future. And it is our duty to build a global, economic, financial, and trading structure for this new era, one that will help people translate hope into peace and prosperity for generations to come.

I know that together we can create an exciting future if we proceed cooperatively and confidently. I just wanted to get everybody together to tell you that I pledge the United States to the fulfillment of that task. We will work with you. Once again, congratulations on the way you're approaching the situation that faces us all now, the situation of cooperation and determination that I think really is capturing the imagination of the people all around the world. The United States will stay with you. We will

stay in here as partners, doing our level best to be a part of the solution.
(###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**Letter to Congress on North American Free Trade
Agreement**

Bush

Source: President Bush

Description: Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Basking Ridge, New Jersey

Date: Sep, 18 1992/18/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: North America

Country: Mexico, Cambodia, United States

Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade

[TEXT]

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

In accordance with section 1103 (a) (1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Act"), I am pleased to notify the House of Representatives and the Senate of my intent to enter into a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the Governments of Mexico and Canada.

This historic agreement represents a comprehensive charter to liberalize trade and investment flows on this continent. NAFTA will link us to our first- and third-largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, respectively, to create one of the world's largest and richest markets, with over 360 million consumers and over \$6.4 trillion in annual output. It will enhance the ability of North American producers to compete in world markets, spur economic growth on the continent, expand employment, and raise living standards.

We are at the dawn of a new era. The threat of global nuclear warfare is gone. The prolonged Cold War struggle against totalitarianism, fought over half a century through immense sacrifices by countless American men and women, has ended in freedom's victory.

Just as America prevailed in the Cold War, we must continue to lead the world in the global economy of the next century. Exports are vital to the health of the US economy, accounting for 70% of our economic growth since 1988 and supporting the jobs of more than 7.5 million Americans. We must continue to expand our exports by strengthening our lead in technological innovation, by giving American firms and workers the tools to compete and

win in international competition, and by negotiating effective agreements to open foreign markets to US goods and services.

The NAFTA eliminates tariffs and other barriers to the flow of goods and services between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. It lifts barriers to investment, strengthens the protection of intellectual property, and improves upon trade rules that govern our bilateral trade relations to ensure that US firms can reap the full rewards of the market opportunities NAFTA creates.

Fifteen months ago, the Congress endorsed the extension of the fast-track procedures to allow the NAFTA negotiations to proceed. The fast track has been a shining example of bipartisan cooperation to enhance our Nation's future.

I am deeply mindful of the commitment I made during the fast-track debate to achieve a balance in the NAFTA that will not only expand our economic growth but also facilitate adjustment for US workers and protect the environment.

While NAFTA will create new, high-wage export-oriented jobs through expanded trade, we have a responsibility to ensure that all US workers, including those affected by NAFTA, have the skills to compete in global markets. Accordingly, last month, I proposed a comprehensive new Federal job training program for all dislocated US workers, including the relatively small number who face adjustments because of NAFTA. It will be funded at \$2 billion annually--nearly triple the current budget for all of our existing worker training and assistance services.

I remain equally committed to ensuring that NAFTA improves environmental protection. The NAFTA contains unprecedented provisions to benefit the environment. In addition, we are moving forward with a comprehensive environmental agenda with the Government of Mexico--an agenda that NAFTA made possible.

The trade of a nation reflects its aims and aspirations. The choice before us is stark--to retreat into protectionism or move forward to new horizons of challenge and opportunity in an ex-panding global economy. Our Nation won the Cold War because of its faith in the abiding power of free people, free markets, and free trade in goods and ideas. We must continue to lead and to trade, confident of our ideals and principles and the ability of American firms and workers to prevail in free and fair competition.

I look forward to working closely with the Congress to develop appropriate legislation to approve and implement this historic agreement.

Sincerely,

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George Bush (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

Sale of F-15 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia

Wisner

Source: Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for International

Security Affairs

Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 23 1992/23/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia

Country: Saudi Arabia, USSR (former)

Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control

[TEXT]

Mr. Chairman, we are here today to discuss with you the Administration's plan to sell F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, valued at \$9 billion. The sale will consist overall of 72 F-15XP aircraft. Twenty-four F-15s will be configured to perform defensive air-to-air combat missions. These aircraft are comparable to the F-15C and D models already sold to Saudi Arabia. The other 48 F-15s in this package will be configured to perform defensive air-to-ground interdiction missions against an aggressor; for example, Iraqi tanks or Iranian patrol boats menacing the Gulf sea lanes.

I will not get into the technical features of the F-15XP configuration, since [Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] Carl Ford will be addressing this in his remarks.

Sale of F-15s Promotes US Security Interests

Instead, I would like to explain how this sale promotes vital US foreign policy and security interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a watershed. We knew at the time, as we know now, that once the Iraqi army was compelled to withdraw from Kuwait, we and our friends in the region would have to take concrete steps to:

- Help build an increased capability to deter and defend against future aggression;
- Buy more time, in the event deterrence fails, for mobilization of support from friendly governments;
- Develop the interoperability that will allow the United States and other friendly forces to reinforce our friends in the region more effectively should that ever again be necessary; and
- Help contribute to stronger and more stable post-crisis security arrangements, regardless of the fate of Saddam Hussein.

In developing a plan to achieve these vital objectives, we also made clear what we did not want. We did not want the security of the Persian Gulf to depend on the long-term presence of US combat forces, and we did not want

to depend solely on a strategy of repeating Operation Desert Storm.

Neither the states in the region, nor we, think that they can build, by themselves, the full range of force that in itself can deter and defeat potential aggressor states--states which have a far larger population base than our Desert Storm partners enjoy. In this context, and given our overall interests, the sale of additional F-15s will enable Saudi Arabia to play a larger role in defending itself, deterring aggression from Iraq and Iran, and promoting stability throughout the Persian Gulf region.

By increasing its defensive capability, Saudi Arabia will be able to confront and contain smaller contingencies on its own. That will reduce the likelihood that US forces will have to be employed.

Moreover, in cases where it is necessary for US forces to be introduced, an enhanced Saudi F-15 capability will increase their ability to operate jointly with US forces, using Saudi infrastructure.

This sale will further strengthen US-Saudi security relations and raise Saudi confidence, an important factor in Riyadh's long-term willingness to continue an active role in promoting regional peace between Israel and the Arab states and, eventually, to engage in regional arms control.

Sale is Consistent With US Policy

The sale of F-15s is fully consistent with the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative. You will recall that one aspect of that initiative calls upon the five largest exporters of arms to the region (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) to establish a system of guidelines to:

- Prevent destabilizing transfers of conventional arms;
- Eliminate all transfers of weapons of mass destruction and their components and precursors;
- Bring transparency to the arms transfer process; and
- Foster responsible arms transfer behavior.

The five have agreed to observe these guidelines, although more work needs to be done to establish a mechanism by which the five consult before making arms transfers.

The emphasis of the President's arms control initiative is responsibility. The exporters have pledged that sales would be made on the basis of legitimate defensive needs and with a view toward promoting regional stability. The proposed sale of F-15s satisfies these requirements and, indeed, is a model of the kind of consideration that should go into any responsible arms sale decision.

The Royal Saudi Air Force has an exemplary record of using US military equipment for purely defensive purposes. Take, for example, two previous sales which were controversial at the time--F-15C/D aircraft and the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] system. The Saudi air force has deployed these aircraft largely for the defense of the eastern province, site of the world's largest oil reserves.

A test of their deterrent value occurred during the 8-year war between Iraq and Iran. In June 1984, an Iranian intruder aircraft headed toward the vital coastal oil installations was shot down by a Saudi F-15C fighter vectored to its target by a Saudi-controlled US AWACS.

The availability of these aircraft to the Saudi air force was one reason why US forces were able to limit the scope of their own direct involvement in the defense of the Gulf oil resources and transit routes from Iranian domination.

F-15s Will Enhance Saudi Defensive Capabilities

We have worked closely with the government and armed forces of Saudi Arabia. We have a very clear understanding of their needs and military requirements. We support this sale because it provides a basic, defensive capability that can be absorbed by the Saudi air force.

I know that some of you will be concerned about the air-to-ground capabilities that some of the F-15s in this package will possess. I urge you not to draw hasty conclusions, equating this capability with providing Saudi Arabia with an offensive air force that can threaten neighboring states. If you will consider the overall force structure of Saudi Arabia and compare that to the size of its population and the vast extent of its borders, the defensive nature of the Saudi force is clear. Selling 48 F-15s with ground attack capabilities will not alter this essential fact. Rather, it will reinforce the defensive orientation of Saudi forces.

Maintaining US Aerospace-Industrial Base

I would also like you to consider the value this sale will have in helping us to maintain our aerospace-industrial base. As Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, I am constantly struck by the extent to which superior US defense technologies contribute positively to the achievement of vital US security goals.

Possession of the best weapons in the world enable us not only to deter or, if deterrence fails, to prevail over an aggressor, it also fosters a confidence in our friends and allies. That, in turn, enhances our influence and ability to pursue our interests. Our willingness to sell appropriately configured, top-quality military capabilities enables us to respond meaningfully to legitimate defensive needs of our friends.

This is crucial to cementing the close ties that the United States can rely on in a crisis. The US-Saudi security relationship is a case study on the validity of this, as was amply demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and continues to be demonstrated in Operation Southern Watch.

Our ability to maintain this kind of industrial base through prudent arms sales enables us to continue producing the best defense items in the world, such as the F-15. It is of vital importance to US security and foreign policy.

Need to Move Forward Now

Given the substantial benefits that will accrue to the United States by selling F-15s to Saudi Arabia, now is the time to move ahead with the sale.

Fighter aircraft sales involve long lead times. Even if the sale were approved today, the aircraft will only become fully operational in three

phases--in 1996, 1997, and 1999. The threat to Saudi Arabia and other states in the region is real and mounting.

Saddam has pledged to rebuild his still formidable military force comprising over 400,000 men and 2,000 tanks. Iran is rebuilding its military at an unprecedented rate, emphasizing offensive capabilities. US agreement to approve the sale now will send an important signal of commitment to Saudi Arabia and of warning to any potential aggressor.

No Harm to Israel's Security

Before concluding my remarks, let me say a few words about the impact of the sale of 72 F-15XP's on Israel's security. Put briefly: Israel's security will be unimpaired by this sale. I say this based on two sets of considerations.

First, the qualitative edge which has enabled Israel confidently to face any threat to its security in the region remains intact, and we are continuing to consult with Israel to ensure this qualitative edge is maintained. Israel will continue to enjoy clear air superiority over any combination of foes, based, first of all, on a fighter pilot force that has no rival in the region.

Israel's top-notch pilot cadre is coupled with an integrated defense system that brings to bear superior intelligence, command and control, tactics, doctrine, and maintenance in a way no other country in the area can hope to match now or in the foreseeable future.

But a second set of factors also needs to be considered when assessing the impact of this F-15 sale on Israel. The Middle East remains a dangerous neighborhood, as I have suggested earlier, but the dynamics of the region have changed radically in the past 2 years. The notion of a unified Arab camp motivated by its most radical elements to confront Israel militarily was dealt a serious blow by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and defeat in the Gulf war.

The Gulf war, in which American, other Western, and Arab troops fought together against a common aggressor, was a watershed. Realization of the importance of the event lay behind President Bush's and Mr. Baker's attempt last year to seize the window of opportunity created by the war to break down taboos which had existed for over 40 years and to substitute dialogue for confrontation between Israel and its neighbors. That initiative, as you know, led to the historic Madrid peace conference and the subsequent launching of serious, face-to-face discussions between Israel and its neighbors on bilateral issues, as well as to multilateral talks on issues of regional concern. Saudi Arabia has fully supported this process.

As a result of the war and the peace process which has followed it, the geostrategic picture in the Middle East today is vastly different from that in which the Carter Administration consulted with Congress on the first F-15 sales in 1978, or in which the Reagan Administration sought approval for AWACS sales in 1983.

Saudi Arabia has scrupulously observed the understandings on which those earlier sales were based. It has served as a reliable security partner with the United States in a variety of circumstances since, including Operation Southern Watch today, and it has played a critical role in the wake of the Gulf war, at the Madrid conference, and since in helping to forge what we hope will be a new, more constructive, and more secure Middle East reality for all our friends in the region.

A strong US-Saudi security re-relationship is the best way to ensure there is no contradiction in the US support for Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Russian Biological Weapons Program

Before turning the floor over to Carl Ford, I wanted to take this opportunity to speak about the important strides we have made recently in addressing our concerns over the illegal biological weapons program Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin made a key breakthrough earlier this year when he acknowledged the existence of the program and made a commitment to end it. I have only recently returned from a trip to Moscow to establish a process by which we can assure ourselves that President Yeltsin's pledge is carried out.

Our joint statement with Russia and the United Kingdom acknowledges the important steps Russia has already taken in dismantling this program, which violates the 1972 biological weapons convention. However, we also acknowledged that there is still quite a way to go. Last week in Moscow, the Russians took the crucial step of promising us access to all of the facilities we are concerned about so that we can satisfy ourselves that the program is shut down. Further, we have set in motion a cooperative process whereby we can work with the Russians to make sure all necessary steps are taken to end this program. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the highest levels of the Russian Government are committed to achieve full compliance with their international obligations regarding biological weapons, and I am convinced that we have now set off on the right path for getting there. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

Status of Middle East Peace Talks

Djerejian

Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs

Description: Opening statement from news briefing, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 24 1992/24/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: MidEast/North Africa

Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

Subject: Mideast Peace Process

[TEXT]

I would like to discuss, first, the general characteristics of this, the sixth

round of the Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Unlike previous rounds, there was a different and more cordial tone between the parties in the talks. These talks were conducted with a seriousness of purpose and in a positive, constructive, and businesslike way.

The parties are definitely grappling with the tough key issues of territory, peace, and security. They have learned that there are no instant, simple solutions, and are dealing with the substantive complexities of the issues.

Now, while there were no so-called breakthroughs during this round, we believe the parties have achieved a good foundation for future progress. In that respect, all sides--Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--in the talks and in the region are engaged in a dialogue on peace, and we must not lose sight of that fundamental fact.

The continuity of the talks in the 11 months since Madrid shows the durability of the process and the commitment by the parties to the process of peace-making. There should be no doubt at this time of the steady engagement of the parties to these negotiations.

In our discussions with the delegations today, we understand the parties will return to Washington on October 21 for a period of about 4 weeks, until November 19, for the seventh round of negotiations.

Concerning our role--the role of the United States as a co-sponsor--we have been actively engaged, with the support of all parties, in the thinking-through of issues and ways to solve problems. Acting Secretary Eagleburger has met with all the delegations and communicated with the leaders in the region and with officials in New York during the UN General Assembly meetings at the ministerial level. All the parties have conveyed to the Acting Secretary their desire to make progress and have this peace-making process succeed.

Of course, President Bush and Chief of Staff Baker have been kept informed of the progress of these talks on a daily basis.

Now, let me make some brief comments on the various negotiations themselves. On the Israeli-Syrian negotiations in this track, for the first time, both exchanged authoritative documents on their views of the principles in the negotiations. While no joint statement was agreed at this time, there are some common elements in their respective positions on the key issues of territory, peace, and security. There were also positive public signals and statements back home, on both sides, which will help condition the environment for peace.

On the Israeli-Palestinian track, for the first time, both sides are fully engaged in negotiating substantive issues, and they began a more detailed discussion on the elements of interim self-governing arrangements. There was definitely a seriousness of purpose in these talks. They exchanged agendas and other papers reflecting questions on each other's proposals.

Again, while there were no breakthroughs, they are engaged in meaningful exchanges which we think can definitely be built upon.

On the Israeli-Jordanian track, it has continued in a very positive atmosphere, as has been characteristic of this track in the earlier rounds. Both sides continue to discuss agenda, and there were experts' discussions on a variety of functional issues. More work needs to be done to narrow the gaps on the agenda, and ways are being explored to achieve this.

In the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, both sides continued in a constructive manner to focus on the key issues between them and appeared to be moving forward with constructive discussion on security issues relating to southern Lebanon. We have urged all sides to do what can be done to

maintain stability in the south of Lebanon and avoid acts which could ignite a cycle of confrontation.

Both Israelis and Lebanese acknowledge the seriousness of purpose of the other side and expressed their intent to remain engaged to move the process forward.

Let me make some brief comments on the multilaterals. Two of the five working groups scheduled to meet this fall have met. The working group on arms control and regional security met in Moscow; and on water resources, in Washington. Both of these working groups went very well, and they developed practical proposals for future progress.

We continue to believe that the multilateral phase of the talks compliments the bilaterals, which, of course, remain the focal point of the peace process, but the initial results indicate to us the potential the multilaterals hold.

Looking briefly ahead, the parties will now go back home and prepare for the next round. We hope the parties use the intervening time to think seriously about the issues and possible solutions; how to bridge the gaps, narrow differences. We will be consulting with the parties in the region and in Washington during this break in the rounds and look forward to their return next month. (###)

Title:

**UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 773 ON IRAQ-
KUWAIT BOUNDARY**

UN

Source: UN Security Council, The United Nations, New York,
New York

Description: Resolution 773

Date: Aug, 26 19928/26/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: MidEast/North Africa

Country: Iraq

Subject: United Nations

[TEXT]

Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, and in particular paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof, and its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991,

Recalling the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 May 1991 concerning the establishment of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (the Commission) and the subsequent exchange of letters of 6 and 13 May 1991 (S/22558, S/22592 and S/22593),

Having considered the Secretary-General's letter of 12 August 1992 to the President of the Security Council transmitting the further report of the Commission,

Recalling in this connection that through the demarcation process the Commission is not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it is simply carrying out the technical task necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the boundary set out in the Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters signed by them on 4 October 1963, and that this task is being carried out in the special circumstances following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the Secretary-General's report for implementing paragraph 3 of that resolution (S/22558),

1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter of 12 August to the President of the Council and the further report of the Commission enclosed therewith;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission for its work on the demarcation of the land boundary, and welcomes its demarcation decisions;
3. Welcomes also the decision of the Commission to consider the Eastern section of the boundary, which includes the offshore boundary, at its next session and urges the Commission to demarcate this part of the boundary as soon as possible and thus complete its work;
4. Underlines its guarantee of the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and its decision to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991);
5. Welcomes further the Secretary-General's intention to carry out at the earliest practicable time the realignment of the demilitarized zone referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) to correspond to the international boundary demarcated by the Commission, with the consequent removal of the Iraqi police posts;
6. Urges the two States concerned to cooperate fully with the work of the Commission;
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

VOTE: 14-0-1 (Ecuador abstaining). (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

UN General Assembly Resolution 47/1 On Serbia-Montenegro

UN

Source: General Assembly, The United Nations, New York

Description: Resolution 47/1

Date: Sep, 22 1992/22/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: E/C Europe

Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States

Subject: United Nations, Regional/Civil Unrest

[TEXT]

Resolution 47/1 (September 22, 1992)

The General Assembly,

Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,¹

1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly;

2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

VOTE: 127-6-26 (Kenya, Swaziland, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe against; Angola, The Bahamas, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ghana, Guyana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Zaire abstaining).

1 A/47/456 (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Department
Statement**

Boucher

Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman

Description: Statement, New York City
Date: Sep, 22 1992/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States
Subject: United Nations, Human Rights

[TEXT]

The United States today transmitted to the UN Secretary General its initial report on information concerning violations of humanitarian law and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We are taking this step pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 771 which requests member states to collect such information and provide it to the United Nations.

The report details allegations of willful killing, torture of prisoners, abuse of civilians in detention centers, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, wanton devastation and destruction of property, and others including mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians (ethnic cleansing).

We are working actively with others on a resolution to create a UN commission to look into these charges, to establish the facts, and to prepare for possible prosecution of individuals found guilty of those crimes.

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**First US Report on War Crimes In the Former
Yugoslavia**

PA

Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs
Description: Submission of Information to the United Nations Security Council in Accordance With Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992)
Date: Sep, 22 1992/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States
Subject: United Nations, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues, Regional/Civil Unrest

[TEXT]

Introduction

In paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992), the United Nations Security Council called upon States and international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to make this information available to the Council. This report is in response to that request.

Paragraph 1 of Resolution 771 reaffirms that all parties to the conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia are bound to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution strongly condemns any violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing." The third preambular paragraph of the resolution lists some of the violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia that have been reported:

"...mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property."

In collating substantiated information on violations of humanitarian law pursuant to paragraph 5 of Resolution 771, the United States has focused on the violations identified in the Resolution and other grave breaches as defined in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949). Consequently the information contained in this report is categorized in accordance with the list of reported violations contained in Resolution 771 as quoted above and the other grave breaches listed in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that do not correspond to those mentioned in Resolution 771 (i.e., willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; compelling a civilian or prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile power; willfully depriving a civilian or prisoner of war [of] the rights of fair and regular trial; and hostage taking).

The discrete incidents reported herein contain indications that they are part of a systematic campaign toward a single objective--the creation of an ethnically "pure" state. We have not identified "ethnic cleansing," which is condemned in paragraph 2 of Resolution 771, as a separate category of violations. Nevertheless, the rubric of ethnic cleansing may unite events that appear unconnected and may therefore prove useful in identifying persons and institutions that may be responsible for violations of established international humanitarian law.

The United States has obtained the information in our report from a variety of sources, including eyewitness accounts reported to the United States. Because Resolution 771 calls upon international humanitarian organizations also to submit the substantiated information in their possession to the

Council, the United States has mentioned but has not summarized the reports it has received from such organizations. Because press reports are [a] matter of public knowledge and often are hearsay, the United States has described only such media reports in which the reporter stated that he/she personally witnessed violations of international humanitarian law. The United States has provided the most reliable information available to us and has relied to the extent possible on eyewitness accounts. Dates at the left margin of the attached report refer to approximate dates of incidents.

For the convenience of the Security Council, we have attached several relevant reports of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The United States will, as appropriate, submit supplemental reports when additional information comes into its possession.

**Former Yugoslavia:
Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention**

Willful Killing

25 August: At Manjaca prison camp, south of Banja Luka, 25 bodies of emaciated men, believed to be prisoners, were discovered with their throats cut. The camp was operated by the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina under General Rado Mladic. (Department of State)

24 August: A resident of Pososje, Bosnia saw 24 men, 2 women, and 2 boys machine-gunned by Serbs in her neighbor's garden. (Reuters)

24 July: A former inmate of the Serb-run Keraterm camp in Prijedor, in northwestern Bosnia, said that more than 100 prisoners died, due to riots after prisoners were denied water for an unspecified time; most suffocated in a crowd of prisoners trying to escape through a window, others were shot while escaping or summarily executed for participating in the riots. (Department of State)

8 July: Several hundred Muslim men were taken prisoner by Serb paramilitaries during a forced evacuation of Gacko, and 36 were murdered. (Department of State)

July: A man interned at the Djakovo Refugee camp witnessed the murder of an acquaintance with the handle of an axe or pick. "He was over 55, and I saw him beaten . . . with my own eyes." The guards in the camp wore fatigues and hats with Chetnik symbols. (Congress)

17 June: A 37-year-old male from Doboje, the village of Pridjele Gornje, described the killing of seven people and the destruction of the mosque by the Chetniks. "Some wore white bands; some wore red caps; some wore JNA [Yugoslav National Army] uniforms. They beat us with rifle butts." (Congress)

June: The Citizens Council of Kozarac appealed for international observers about June 6 claiming that a large-scale massacre had occurred in Kozarac and that truckloads of bodies had been taken away to cover up the crimes committed there. (Department of State)

27 May: A 55-year-old woman from Kozarac was brought to camp in Trnopolje on May 27 where she and a group of 300-400 witnessed the killing by machine gun of Besic Jusuf (50), Karabasic Ismet (35), Ekrem Karabasic

(25), Sejdo Karabasic (21), and Meho Vukanovic (25). "They (Chetniks and Serbs) killed them because they had haircuts that made them think they were Ustashi." (Congress)

26 May: About 200 Muslim refugees from Visegrad heading for Macedonia were turned back at the Mokra Gora border crossing into Serbia on May 26. An employee of the bus company that was transporting the refugees said that the group was stopped outside Bosanska Jagodina later that day by a group of armed men, and that he saw 17 male refugees taken from the buses and "liquidated." The killers were members of two Serbian "volunteer" groups operating in the local Serb "territorial defense" formation, which had been systematically abducting and murdering Muslims in the region. (Department of State)

2-22 May: A man reliably believed to be a former inmate of the Serb-run Luka camp in Brcko described evidence of violence in the camp, including bloodstains. According to other inmates, he said, as many as 1,000 killings took place at Luka camp between May 2-22, after which the bodies were buried in a mass grave near a livestock farm called Bimex-Brcko. (Department of State)

21 May: A 29-year-old woman from Kabljami, in the vicinity of Prijedor, on May 21 witnessed the killing of five or six policemen. "They also killed some men who possessed tractors." (Congress)

18 May: "I saw my father and mother being killed," said a resident of Kozarac. "Both were 67 years old." The killer was a 21-year-old neighbor. "He probably slaughtered 30 elderly people that day." (Congress)

16 May-14 July: A Muslim man, taken to Prnjavor camp in Bosnian Serb Krajina, described beatings by Serbian military police. He saw one man die during a beating on May 17 and another died on June 6. The alleged killers were members of groups called White Eagles or White Wolves. (Congress)

7 May: A private citizen reported that he had visited a cattle slaughterhouse near Brcko, near the Luka camp. He heard screams and shots. He spoke with a survivor of the facility, who said that 100-300 persons were killed each day from May 7-14. (Department of State)

7 May: A resident of Brcko told of mass killings during the first week of May when Brcko surrendered to Serb forces with little resistance. (Department of State)

2 May: A 38-year-old inmate at the Djakovo Refugee camp in Croatia said that she was taken on May 9 to Luka camp near Brcko, where she saw 10 people being killed every day with rifle butts and bottles.

Two prisoners were required to slap each other. The one who didn't slap as hard was killed. One time, I saw them cut off the ears of the weak slapper, then cut off his nose and then kill him by cutting his throat.

(Congress)

May: Four relatives of a Bosnian refugee were chopped up by Chetniks and burned, according to May 21 testimony given to the Carinthian provincial government of Austria. During the same testimony, the refugee described how the Chetniks had cut his cousin with razor blades and pulled off his skin with pliers. (Department of State)

May: An American citizen, in the custody of Serbian forces after serving in the Croatian army, said that he saw Serbian soldiers torture a Croatian soldier to death in a camp near Bileca, Bosnia. He saw the same soldiers torture another group of Croatian prisoners. He saw one die being carried away. (Department of State)

10 April: A Serb who had been married to a Bosnian Muslim told US Embassy officers in Budapest on September 9 that several Yugoslav army tanks had come in to Zvornik on April 10. About 30 masked irregulars, who she claimed belonged to a unit under "Arkan," conducted a house-to-house search for Muslim men by checking identity cards. The Serbs then allegedly cut off the heads, hands, and feet of their victims. (Department of State)

Torture of Prisoners

6 August: ITN [a UK television network] and The Guardian reported on a visit by journalists to Trnopolje, in northeastern Bosnia, where the journalists witnessed emaciated prisoners and were given smuggled pictures of men with terrible injuries from beatings allegedly inflicted by Serb soldiers at Omarska and other camps. (London Press Association)

July: A 62-year-old inmate described his 18-day ordeal at the Djakovo Refugee camp in Croatia.

There were 199 of us in the camp. I know the number because I counted the pieces of bread that were given out. While in the camp, I was hit and beaten up. My legs were swollen, I had bruises on my face, and my eyes were swollen. They would pour water on me and continue beating me.

(Congress)

June-July: A 60-year-old man signed in as prisoner number 519 in the Bosanski Samac camp.

"They hit me with a stick and burned me with cigarettes. They would throw water on me to wake me up so they could continue the beatings. I got pneumonia because of the cold water."

On the day he was released, he was beaten in the stomach. A certificate from Slavanski Brod Medical Center showed that he was treated July 5-17 for contusions, fractured ribs, and psychotic depression. He had burn marks on his left arm and a large scar on the top of his head. (Congress)

March-May: Two American citizens who enlisted and served in the Croatian army were incarcerated from March to May in three separate POW camps during which time they were beaten daily with gun stocks. They also witnessed daily beatings of other prisoners. The prisoners were subjected to electric shock treatment, use of a "stun gun," and sexual assaults. Scars and bruises were still evident on at least one of the Americans when he was turned over to the US ambassador in Belgrade. (Department of State)

Abuse of Civilians in Detention Centers

1 September: Congressman Frank Wolf visited a prison camp, operated by paramilitaries of the Serbian Democratic party (SDS) at Batkovic. Reportedly 1,280 men were held in two grossly overcrowded sheds where they slept on straw. Most of the prisoners were apparently being held for no reason other than their ethnic identity. (Department of State)

30-31 August: CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission member John Zerolis, a US Foreign Service Officer assigned to the US Embassy in Zagreb, inspected the Serb-run prison camp of Manjaca in northwest Bosnia. He observed several thousand prisoners, none of whom was wearing any form of uniform. At that time his group was told by prisoners that they were non-combatants, that they had been summoned from their homes or simply called to the door, and that they were then arrested. Asked about attempted escapes from Manjaca, camp commander

Lt. Col. Popovic said there had never been any, and there "never would be any." (Department of State)

14 August: "Tens--possibly scores" of women were confined uncomfortably in an overheated metal shed that appeared to be a former munitions warehouse in a disused Yugoslav Army barracks outside Capljina run by Major Miro Hrstic of the Croatian Defense Association of HOS. In response to questions from journalists about the shed, Hrstic said, "Let that remain a secret." (London, The Guardian)

August: Serbian civilian inmates, including a pregnant woman and elderly people, are subjected to beatings at the former JNA Victor Bubanj barracks in Sarajevo, a camp run by Bosnian Muslims. (Belgrade's opposition weekly, Vreme)

August: Women inmates were raped while being held at the Croat-run Odzak camp, according to a Western reporter who interviewed Serb refugees. (Department of State)

15 July: A Serbian artillery attack on Bosanski Brod killed 9 and wounded over 30 at a nearby refugee center. (Department of State)

26 May-26 June: A 43-year-old woman who was interviewed on August 10 at the Spnsko Water Facility near Zagreb had been taken on May 26 to Prijedor to the Trnoplje Camp. During her 30-day captivity, "drunk soldiers came into the room to get women and girls as young as 12 and 13 . . . the girls said they had been raped. Some of the girls didn't return." (Congress)

Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants

August-8 September: Rexhep Osmani, president of the Naim Frasheri Teachers' Association in Kosovo, has been in jail since mid-August facing undefined charges. Forty-one school administrators and teachers were "brutally treated" during the week of September 1 by Serb authorities. Serbian police "opened fire" against high school students in early September at the PEC Technical School Shaben Spahija, according to Kosova education officials. (Department of State)

6 September: A convoy of UN trucks carrying aid supplies to Bosnian civilians was mortared on September 6. Snipers fired all day at UN personnel as they distributed food to people in Sarajevo. (Hamburg DPA)

5 September: Serb militia--who control the main water reservoir outside of Sarajevo--were reducing water supplies to the city in "another attack on civilians," according to the deputy commander of the Bosnian forces. (API)

3 September: Marco Betti, Cesare Buttaglieri, Giuliano Velardi, and Marco Rigliaco were killed on September 3 when their G-222 aircraft--which was carrying five tons of blankets to Sarajevo on a UN relief mission--was shot down by up to three ground-to-air missiles. (Rome, ANSA; London, The Independent)

Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property

4 September: Destruction and damage to homes is occurring at the rate of hundreds each day, making them unsuitable for habitation during the winter, according to UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] Zagreb program coordinator Anthony Land. (Department of State)

August: The Chetniks burned down houses, threw grenades, and planted

bombs in Montenegro, according to refugee Ms. Medina, who was recorded on May 21 by the Carinthian provincial government of Austria. (Department of State)

June: Yugoslav military aircraft bombed a tobacco factory in the Bosnian town of Grude to stunt the struggling economy, according to the US Senate staff report. (Congress)

26 May: On May 26, the 200-year-old mosque of Prijedor was destroyed. (MAGYAR SZO)

April: In a letter to the US Secretary of State dated May 1, Professor Muhamed Dresevljakovic--the mayor of Sarajevo--wrote that militant parts of the Serbian Democratic party had destroyed

. . . civil sections, vital economy and communal buildings, schools and nursery schools, monuments of culture, boards of health, sacred monuments.

The mayor begged, "Don't let Sarajevo become a second Vukovar, Bosanski Brod, or Foca--cities vanished from the face of the earth." (Department of State)

March-July: The Croatian city of Slavonski Brod has been hit by over 10,000 artillery rounds, bombs, mortars, and ground-to-ground rockets since March. As of July 16, over 70 civilians had been killed, including 18 children, and over 200 wounded. The 3,000 buildings that had been damaged included 15% of the local residential housing. (Department of State)

Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of Civilians

3 September: Almost 200 judges were dismissed from positions in Kosovo because of their Albanian ethnic identity. (Department of State)

1 September: Inmates in the Manjaca camp, south of Banja Luka and operated by the Bosnian Serb army, are civilians arrested because of their ethnic identity, according to US Embassy sources in Banja Luka. (Department of State)

24 August: A resident of Pososje was taken by Serbs and, with other persons, robbed and turned loose near Muslim lines at Travnik. (Reuters)

20 August: More than 1,500 primarily Muslim refugees were forced to leave the northwestern Bosnian town of Sanski Most and travel through the night--many by foot--to Travnik. Along the way, more than 40 of their vehicles were stolen. (AFI)

4 August: Serbian Democratic party (SDS) strategy is to expel Muslim Slavs from most of Bosnia, according to the US Embassy in Belgrade. The SDS campaign of ethnic cleansing is causing misery and death for large numbers of Bosnian Muslims. (Department of State)

2 August: Albanian leaders described the Serbian intention of changing the ethnic balance in Kosovo. Since 1989, over 100,000 Albanians have been deprived of their jobs. This fall, 64,000 Albanian secondary school students may boycott classes, refusing a required Serbian curriculum. (Department of State)

8 July: Ethnic Muslims were forced from the district of Gacko, on the southern border with Montenegro. (Department of State)

24 June: SDS/JNA forces drove non-Serbs--as well as Serbs married to

Muslims or Croats, and Serbs who were "disloyal"--out of their homes. Those expelled were given as little as 30 minutes to gather their belongings. (Department of State)

9 June: Serb paramilitaries who had taken control of the Muslim-majority districts of Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Vlasenica were systematically expelling Muslims. Muslims in the settlement of Grobnica, near Zvornik, were given a 24-hour ultimatum to leave, and were not being allowed to carry any possessions with them. The nearby town of Kozluk, whose population of 6,000 was predominantly Muslim, was under SDS occupation and "cleansed" as well. (Department of State)

4 June: The "war presidency" has been established following the Serb paramilitary occupation of Visegrad. Much of the district's Muslim population has fled and the Serbs have been confiscating the property of "all those citizens whose return to the territory of the Visegrad district has been forbidden." The "war presidency" has been inviting "Serb refugees from other areas" to move into vacant homes in Visegrad. (Department of State)

2 June: Serb paramilitaries have destroyed neighborhoods with large Muslim populations and killed some people in the towns of Sanski Most and Prijedor, in northwestern Bosnia. An office of emigration was established in Banja Luka to "facilitate" population transfers, since "more and more citizens of all nationalities want to change their place and area of residence." (Department of State)

17 March: A source close to Bosnian President Izetbegovic suggested that the upsurge of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was coordinated by the Serbian Democratic party (SDS) and others, perhaps including the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the army. The army reportedly had provided arms to the Serb militants in Bosanski Brod, Zenica, Kalinovik, and near Sarajevo. (Department of State) (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

South Africa: A Time for Leadership

Cohen

Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 23 1992/23/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: Subsaharan Africa

Country: South Africa

Subject: Democratization, Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest

[TEXT]

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to give the Administration's views on the situation in South Africa. I welcome this opportunity to continue our fruitful dialogue on South Africa's transition from apartheid.

Two months ago today, I testified on this subject before the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. At that time, I expressed the Administration's deep concern about developments that led to suspension in June of talks within the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or CODESA. Those talks, which had begun with such hope in December 1991, stalled over fundamental differences on basic issues such as rights for minorities, the degree of devolution of power to regional governments and local authorities, and the length of time for effecting a transition to a government based on a new constitution.

Following the June 17 killing of over 40 men, women, and children in the township of Boipatong, allegedly by residents of a nearby workers' hostel, the African National Congress (ANC) declared it would not resume the talks until the government addressed its demands for action to stop the violence and for concessions relating to the negotiations. Addressing this impasse 2 months ago, I urged all sides to take the steps necessary to get the negotiations back underway.

The Violence Must End

Tragically, this has not happened. The consequences of the continuing impasse are clear for all to see. Violence has continued unrelentingly, and the daily death toll mounts. Earlier this month, as we Americans were celebrating Labor Day, security forces of the Ciskei homeland mowed down with automatic gunfire hundreds of ANC demonstrators in the streets of its capital, Bisho. When the firing stopped, two dozen people lay dead, and over 200 were injured. These killings and those that now are commonplace every day in South Africa are senseless, and they must stop. It is time for South Africans to put aside posturing and brinkmanship and to resolve the few, albeit difficult, remaining issues that divide them. Fortunately, there are indications that South African leaders may be coming to that same conclusion.

A Return to the Negotiating Table

We remain convinced that negotiations offer the only viable means for South Africa's peaceful transition to non-racial democracy. Given the continuing violence and the related deterioration of South Africa's economy, we believe these negotiations must resume soon. There can be no return to the repression of the apartheid era, nor does armed revolution offer an alternative path to democracy.

The Bisho tragedy seemingly shocked all parties into recognizing the costs and risks of escalating violence. We, along with the international community and many in South Africa, placed the responsibility for the bloodshed where it belonged--on both sides. Subsequently, the two sides drew back from the brink and have made gestures toward restoring negotiations. President de Klerk made the dramatic offer of a summit meeting; ANC President Mandela accepted conditionally. The ANC has

narrowed its previous preconditions to three "undertakings" by the government concerning bans on carrying traditional weapons, increased security at workers' hostels, and movement on release of individuals the ANC considers "political prisoners." The government, for its part, has accepted that violence is a major obstacle to restoring a constructive climate for negotiations, thus opening the way to addressing these issues that have been a major source of anger and frustration for the ANC.

Adding to this momentum is the growing recognition by all sides that every day of delay in the transition to a democratic South Africa contributes to further economic decline and makes eventual recovery more difficult. A further weakened economy is in no one's best interests. South Africa needs a strong, vibrant free-market economy if it is to redress effectively the appalling socioeconomic legacy of apartheid.

While the country thus appears to have weathered the most recent crisis, tensions remain high, and elements within the constituencies of the various parties remain restive. Before the summit can take place, there will have to be agreement on concrete steps to be taken to curb violence, most notably, bans on the public display of all weapons and securing hostels. These measures have been advocated by the Goldstone Commission and endorsed by the UN Secretary General's special representative. We are hopeful that agreement is within grasp on these issues as well as on the contentious issue of political prisoners.

President de Klerk, ANC President Mandela, and other South African political leaders must now once again demonstrate the decisive leadership so amply shown in the past. They must find common ground to resolve those issues which have blocked resumption of the talks. Their failure to do so can only result in more bloodshed as South Africa's transition to democracy is further delayed.

As leader of the government, President de Klerk bears special responsibility to take effective steps to address the continuing violence. We hold the South African Government ultimately responsible for the actions of the defense forces of the so-called independent homelands. The government must take steps to ensure there are no repetitions of the excessive and unjustified use of lethal force used by the Ciskei security force against ANC demonstrators on September 7.

Similarly, mass actions aimed at confrontations that add to the already unacceptable level of violence are clearly ill advised. This is particularly the case when mass action proceeds from the false premise that easy victories can be gained on issues already the subject of serious negotiations. The ANC must contribute to creating a constructive atmosphere for resumption of the talks. All South Africans have a fundamental right to organize peaceful protest and to be adequately protected while exercising that right. We are encouraged that the ANC recently decided to postpone marches into Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu, demonstrations that would have led to further bloodshed. We hope the ANC will seriously reconsider its tactic of confrontation with the homeland governments before rescheduling these marches.

Furthermore, we believe President Mandela and Chief Buthelezi must move decisively to address the enduring differences between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party--differences that fuel much of today's violence. In this regard, and in the context of the other actions I have suggested, I hope that these two leaders will soon meet to begin bridging the gap that divides them, thereby giving a clear signal to their communities that their political objectives must be pursued through peaceful means. Inkatha and the ANC must encourage the basic right of all South Africans to pursue lawful political activity in all parts of the country--"no go" areas are not acceptable.

I realize these steps will not be easy, but these are critical times for South

Africa--the future of the nation is at stake. I call on these leaders to rise to the demands of the occasion and make the necessary tough decisions that will enable South Africa to resume the path toward peaceful transition to non-racial democracy.

US Role

My thoughts today outlined the continuing role of the United States as concerned outsider. We have sought consistently to help foster a process which will facilitate a rapid, peaceful transition to non-racial democracy.

We maintain an ongoing dialogue with South African leaders across the spectrum, urging an end to the violence and helping refocus attention on negotiations. And we continue our assistance programs with the objectives of preparing black South Africans for positions of leadership in a new South Africa and addressing the broad development concerns of the country's black population.

The United States has also supported strongly the involvement of the United Nations in South Africa. In July, Special Representative Cyrus Vance visited South Africa to assess how the United Nations could support the peace process. On the basis of his findings, the United Nations is now dispatching 50 observers to South Africa to cooperate with the existing structures of the national peace accord. Some of these observers are already on the job; the others will arrive shortly. The Secretary General also has dispatched his special envoy, Virendra Dayal, to further facilitate efforts to restore the negotiating environment. The effectiveness of UN observers has already been demonstrated. In early August, they were instrumental in negotiating on-the-ground arrangements that successfully avoided bloodshed during an earlier ANC March on Ciskei. We expect the UN observers--as well as others to be provided by the EC [European Community] and the Commonwealth--will be an important resource in checking the violence. We are encouraged by the South African Government's willingness to accept and, indeed, welcome this international involvement.

Next Steps

The United States remains determined to do whatever we can to assist South Africa's transition to a free, non-racial democracy with a vibrant, market-based economy. Ultimately, however, the future of South Africa lies in the hands of the South Africans themselves. Only they can make and implement the decisions needed to heal the deep wounds left by decades of apartheid. Only they can take the steps to redress the socioeconomic legacy of apartheid. I have already set forth the steps that I believe must be taken by the major players to get the talks underway once again and to bring them to a successful conclusion.

In earlier testimony, I set forth several points which we believe are basic to a genuine democratic solution in South Africa. They bear repeating:

- A solution must include all relevant parties and promote tolerance in a country of great diversity;
- It should acknowledge the right of the majority to govern while assuring that all South Africans have a stake in their government; and
- It should ensure that government functions within an agreed framework which includes protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, but it

should avoid overly complex arrangements intended to guarantee a share of power to particular groups, an arrangement that would frustrate effective governance. Minorities have a right to safeguards; they cannot expect a veto.

In that same testimony, I urged South Africans to consider seriously the degree to which federalism might address many of the tensions inherent in their society. Subsequent debate has revealed that some in South Africa portray federalism as a facade for stripping the central government of most significant authority. It is just such efforts to corrupt the purposes of federalism and turn it to the defense of the status quo that have earned it the enmity of so many in the disenfranchised majority and stifled serious debate. All South Africans should understand that effective federalism is a framework fully consistent with strong, responsive government at the national, regional, and local levels with power and responsibility reserved for those levels most responsive to citizen needs and desires.

I remain hopeful [that] the negotiations will soon resume. All South Africa's leading parties remain committed to the negotiating process, realizing full well that it is the only viable alternative. I fully expect that once negotiations resume, the parties will build on the substantial progress they have already made. I firmly believe that the elements of a final agreement are within reach. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

US Relief Effort in Somalia

Natsios

Source: Andrew S. Natsios, President's Special Coordinator for Somali Relief, US Agency for International Development

Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 16 1992/16/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: Subsaharan Africa

Country: Somalia

Subject: Development/Relief Aid, United Nations

[TEXT]

Mr. Chairman, my current and previous positions have made me witness over the past several years to most of the world's major famines and many other humanitarian crises. I can tell you that what I saw in Somalia a few weeks ago is the most unspeakably tragic human suffering I have ever seen. And it is tragedy compounded by profound intractability.

One recent week in Baidoa, one of the worst-hit towns, the ICRC

[International Committee of the Red Cross] collected 1,334 bodies--young and old victims of starvation and Somalia's latest killer: disease. My survey of Baidoa provided haunting images too horrific and too numerous for the mind to fully absorb: the body of a 12-year-old boy who had just died being carted out of a feeding center in a wheelbarrow; the bodies of two elderly women who had just died lying in the corridor of that center, as yet uncollected because desperate relief workers were absorbed with the needs of the dying; an 11-year-old girl in that center, with no mother or father, scrounging food for her 5-year-old sister--she would become her family's lone and lonely survivor when the 5-year-old died before the afternoon was over.

Review of US Government Activities

International relief organizations, with consistent US Government support, are battling this catastrophe, despite the enormity of the Somali tragedy and unprecedented chaos in which relief workers risk their lives. As you know, the US Government has been involved in providing humanitarian relief to Somalia since the crisis began 19 months ago. To date, we have pledged over \$146 million in humanitarian aid, including 225,000 mt [metric tons] of food. We will ship a total of 120,000 mt of food this fiscal year.

The United States [has] activated a range of interventions since December 1990: press conferences and briefings to raise awareness of the Somalia crisis; demarches to other donors to do more; relief assessment missions to Somalia and neighboring refugee-impacted countries; allocation of additional food resources; and a steady stream of grants to those courageous private voluntary organizations (PVOs) willing to work in Somalia and with refugees.

In the summer of 1991, USAID [US Agency for International Development] called upon the ICRC to initiate a massive feeding program in Somalia. The ICRC's outstanding--indeed, heroic--work has staved off starvation for hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

In December 1991, we asked the United Nations to re-enter Somalia. It did so in January 1992 but has been unable to address the enormous needs. This summer, I asked Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Director Jim Kunder to lead a mission to the region, a mission on which Senator Kassenbaum played a key role. That assessment trip coincided with the President's reading a cable by US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone on the current situation along the Kenya-Somalia border. The President, deeply disturbed by what he read in the ambassador's report and heard from the Kunder mission, ordered an expanded US initiative. On August 14, the President announced that:

-- The Department of Defense (DOD) would initiate emergency airlifts to Somalia and drought- and refugee-impacted areas of northern Kenya;

-- The United States would seek a [UN] Security Council resolution that would authorize the use of additional measures to move food into Somalia;

-- The United States would urge the United Nations to convene a donors' conference to help accelerate delivery of relief supplies; and

-- The United States would provide an additional 145,000 mt of food for the Somalia relief effort.

At that time, the President also named me as his Special Coordinator for Somali Relief.

Current Situation

Despite all of our efforts to help avert disaster in Somalia, we are now facing, in all its horror and wasting, mass starvation--mass starvation directly attributable to insecurity that prevents relief groups from saving lives. The magnitude of the tragedy today is staggering:

-- An estimated one-third of the Somali population of 6.5 million is estimated to be at risk of starvation;

-- Relief groups estimate that 25% of all children under 5 have died and that the remaining could soon perish; as many as 1,000 to 2,000 people could be dying daily;

-- There are now over 800,000 Somali refugees in nearby countries--many living in barbarous conditions.

Observations From Somalia Trip

During my travel to Somalia, I observed actions that are working. The US airlift, both into northern Kenya and Somalia, is running smoothly. Although the United Nations, ICRC, and PVOs had some initial reservations about our initiative, they are now working closely with the DOD, USAID, [and the] Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to move relief supplies. General Libutti, who manages the DOD airlift, and Bill Garvelink, DART team leader, are to be commended for their outstanding leadership and commitment to making this program work.

As of September 14, 2,934 mt of food have been moved to a total of five locations: Wajir and Garissa in northern Kenya, and Baidoa; Belet Huen and Oddur in south-central Somalia. In the Somali towns supplied by DOD airlifts, we are welcomed by the clan elders, and security conditions, in general, are adequate to permit relief operations to take place.

I observed in one of those towns, Belet Huen, that the airlift has already had a positive impact on the price of food in the market place. Rice prices there have dropped from 120,000 to 80,000 Somali shillings per 50-kilo bag; (\$1 equals 7,000 Somali shillings in Belet Huen). In addition, there are indications that our initiative has reduced the current refugee flow from Somalia to Kenya by 90%.

In many areas, the clan elders said they would be pleased to have UN troops to help control the young thugs who sometimes terrorize the towns. In these areas, banditry is the cause of disruptions in relief operations, not organized clan violence.

I also observed some of the over 600 ICRC soup kitchens, at which almost 1 million Somalis receive meals daily. Without a doubt, ICRC has done an extraordinary job under impossible conditions and clearly has the pre-eminent operational position in the relief effort. It deserves a Nobel Peace Prize for the life-saving work it is performing there. Other outstanding organizations I met with include Save the Children (United Kingdom), Irish

Concern, and the US groups--International Medical Corps and CARE.

The UN system is attempting to strengthen its performance in the coordination and implementation of relief to date. While in Nairobi, I urged the World Food Program (WFP) to establish a logistics coordination center--an essential step if the United Nations is to provide strong leadership and fully coordinate the relief effort. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance will provide close to \$1 million to WFP for the establishment of that center. WFP has already initiated UN/PVO/donor coordination meetings on flight logistics.

The United Nations has also recently set forth an "Accelerated Humanitarian Action Plan for Somalia," which it hopes will provide a comprehensive framework for relief and rehabilitation.

US Strategy

It is critical, especially in this fluid and complex crisis, that we have a clear plan for moving Somalia from this plague of utter destitution toward a viable economy and workable political reconciliation. Without these, a generation of Somalis will be condemned, at best, to survival in the soup lines and, at worst, widespread death preceded by obscene suffering.

We have worked hard at discerning a viable relief strategy for Somalia--a strategy with six elements. I would like to briefly describe each of these elements.

Emergency Airlifts. Until security improves and a road network for relief is established, targeted airlifts will be necessary. We anticipate that our military airlift initiative will, over time, transition to an airlift operation run by civilian companies and supported by a wide range of donors. To that end, USAID has contracted with Southern Air Transport to make available two C-130 aircraft for relief operations.

I want to stress, however, that airlifts are only a small component of our relief strategy and, by themselves, will probably deliver no more than 10% of the food requirements in any month.

Targeted Decentralized Feeding Programs. Free food distribution will be required for a large segment of the Somalia population for a considerable time to come. We will continue to support the ICRC soup kitchens as well as supplementary feeding programs for malnourished children.

As the quantity of food in Somalia increases and prices decline, we anticipate that it will be less of a target for looters. We encourage large-scale dry food distributions through the United Nations, ICRC, and PVOs in rural areas. This is essential if we are to stop forced migrations into cities--a trek that kills many already-weakened Somalis.

Market Interventions. In order to "flood" Somalia with food, more use must be made of commercial channels. We propose the sale of food to Somali merchants to drive down and stabilize market prices. A reduction in food prices should allow more Somalis to access the markets for food. In addition, it should reduce the overall value of food, removing it as a substitute currency.

PVOs will be responsible for monitoring market prices. Proceeds from the food sales would be used by the PVO community to initiate cash-for-work and other relief and rehabilitation programs.

At this time, we have food experts looking at ways to set up sales to local traders "offshore" in Djibouti and Kenya. The US PVO, CARE, is initiating this kind of program in northwest Somalia and is planning a similar program in the south. The International Rescue Committee and World Vision are also interested in getting involved.

Rehabilitation. Interventions in the livestock, agriculture, and water sectors are critically important if we are to help restore the Somalia economy. We propose that rehabilitation interventions be targeted at stable cities and regions--for example, Belet Huen, Oddur, and the northeast--where clan leaders are able to resolve their disputes peacefully. By supporting those responsible local leaders, we hope to send a message to other clan and political leaders that continued violence will prevent them from having access to rehabilitation efforts of the United States.

Decentralization of UN Security Guards. We support the notion of placing additional UN troops in areas outside Mogadishu in calmer areas where clan leaders welcome their presence. They could play an important role by protecting airstrips and feeding centers and could reinforce the leadership role of local authorities, with whom they would work closely.

We will focus our rehabilitation efforts in areas where the security guards and local authorities are working together, thereby reinforcing the linkages between security, responsible leadership, and international aid.

Promoting UN Leadership in Relief and Reconciliation. We commend UN Special Representative for Somalia Ambassador Sahnoun's diplomatic initiatives in Somalia and fully support his initiatives for promoting reconciliation. Without this diplomatic element, there can be no resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

In addition, we fully support a transition to a UN-coordinated multilateral relief effort. We welcome the UN plans to hold a relief coordination conference later this month. In addition, we have offered resources to UN agencies to expand their staff for Somalia programs. We will continue to support UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], WFP, and other UN agencies that demonstrate competence in managing Somali relief programs.

Other Donors

In addition to these six elements, I should note that the United States is also working hard to solicit additional support from other donors. We are urging that previous pledges be honored and that additional resources be committed for the relief effort. The EC [European Community] has been the most involved donor aside from the United States; the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Italy, Australia, and Japan have also been energized by the crisis and are responding.

The Need for Somali Leadership

Ultimately, we must all call on the Somali leaders to resolve this crisis. Without an end to clan and sub-clan conflicts, innocent victims of this tragedy will continue to die, despite the best efforts of relief agencies and donor governments.

I cannot emphasize enough the vital links that exist between political reconciliation, improved security, and the international community's ability to help Somalia move from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation of the country. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

Execution of Sudanese USAID Employee

Snyder

Source: Acting Spokesman Joseph Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 22 1992/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Sudan
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest

[TEXT]

We have learned with sadness and outrage that Mr. Andrew Tombe, a Sudanese citizen employed by the USAID [US Agency for International Development] mission in Sudan, has been executed by the Government of Sudan. The Government of Sudan maintains that Mr. Tombe was tried and convicted of treason by a military tribunal; if such a trial took place, it would have been held in secret and would have been a clear violation of international legal standards pertaining to his detention and alleged trial. The Government of Sudan has supplied no evidence to us that would indicate that Mr. Tombe was guilty of treason. We believe him to be innocent.

We have reliable information that a second USAID employee, Mr. Baudouin Tally, has also been executed. Employees of the United Nations and other organizations are also reported missing. Several credible sources indicate widespread killing and abuse of the civilian population in Juba by the army and militia of the Government of Sudan.

In spite of our repeated requests in Washington and Khartoum, Sudanese authorities have not provided us with information on the whereabouts of our Foreign Service national employees at the USAID compound in Juba, nor have they allowed travel by US embassy officials to Juba. Our Foreign Service nationals in Sudan have given us faithful service under very difficult conditions.

We strongly condemn the Sudanese Government for its unwarranted execution of Mr. Tombe. We demand that the Sudanese Government immediately provide a full accounting of Mr. Tombe's detention, trial, and execution and also provide information on the whereabouts and condition of Mr. Tally. We further call on the Sudanese Government to allow an immediate inspection of the condition of the civilian population in Juba by

the International Committee of the Red Cross, including access to those being held in detention. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**Vietnam: Funding for Assistance to Voluntary
Returnees to Vietnam**

Boucher

Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 16 1992/16/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: Southeast Asia

Country: Vietnam

Subject: Immigration, Refugees, Development/Relief Aid,
POW/MIA Issues

[TEXT]

The United States will contribute up to \$2 million to non-governmental organizations working in Vietnam, for programs to assist Vietnamese asylum seekers who have voluntarily returned home from camps of first asylum in Southeast Asia.

The provision of assistance to those returning to Vietnam is important to the United States, both for humanitarian reasons and because it reflects the US commitment to the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The voluntary repatriation program under the Comprehensive Plan of Action is a major element in the international response to the problem of refugees and asylum seekers in Southeast Asia.

This contribution also represents another effort by the United States to address the humanitarian concerns of the Vietnamese people--in recognition of Vietnamese cooperation in addressing our concerns, notably accounting for our POW/MIAs.

Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations Trinh Xuan Lang, during his introductory call on Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Clark, Jr., and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs Sarah Moten, was informed of this program today. Discussion also focused on efforts by the US and Vietnamese Governments to address humanitarian concerns--especially the fullest possible accounting for US POW/MIAs and the implementation of the UN settlement in Cambodia.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Community, and other groups also have assistance programs in place to assist returnees.

Examples of the kind of initial reintegration project activities to be undertaken include vocational training, micro-business enterprise

development training, and employment development.

In addition to this funding, the United States is contributing some \$800,000 to UNHCR for a program to assist in the reintegration of minors who are returning from the camps in Southeast Asia to be reunited with their families.

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**Russia: US Opens Consulate General In
Vladivostok**

Snyder

Source: Acting Spokesman Joseph Snyder

Description: Statement, Washington, DC

Date: Sep, 21 1992/21/92

Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements

Region: Eurasia

Country: Russia

Subject: State Department

[TEXT]

The US Consulate General in Vladivostok, Russia, will open on Tuesday, September 22.

This step is being taken following the exchange of diplomatic notes regarding the establishment of consulates general in Seattle and Vladivostok by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush during their June summit meeting.

Our consul general will be Randall LeCocq. He and four other Department of State officers will work initially in temporary quarters. Embassy officials, business representatives, and Russian and local government officials will mark the opening at a formal ceremony.

Plans are under way by the Russian Federation to open its consulate in Seattle in the near future. (###)

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992

Title:

**Focus on the Emerging Democracies A Periodic
Update**

PA

Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs

Date: Sep, 28 1992/28/92

Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies

Region: Eurasia

Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia

Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange

[TEXT]

Points of Contact For US Firms Seeking Business Opportunities in The New Independent States

Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger serves as Coordinator of US Assistance Policy for the New Republics of the Former Soviet Union. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Dr. Michael Boskin, Deputy Treasury Secretary John Robson, US Agency for International Development Administrator Ronald W. Roskens, and Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman are the Deputy Coordinators. In addition, each US Government agency listed below has identified key individuals as points of contact.

Department of State

The Office of the Deputy to the Coordinator is headed by Ambassador Richard L. Armitage, who reports to the Acting Secretary of State. Ambassador Armitage is responsible for overall coordination of US assistance policy, and technical assistance programs (ongoing or planned) for the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This office is the initial point of contact for US firms interested in business and investment opportunities.

Priscilla Rabb-Ayres
Senior Adviser, Private Sector Programs
D/CISA, Rm. 1004
US Department of State 2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520
Tel: 202-647-2626
Fax: 202-647-2636

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

The Center for Trade and Investment Services provides specific information about USAID programs and activities.

Mr. Caesar Gonzmart
USAID, SA-2, Room 100
Washington, DC 20523-0229
Tel: 202-663-2660
or 1-800-USAID-4-U
(1-800-872-4348)
Fax: 202-663-2670

Department of Commerce

The Business Information Service for the New Independent States (BISNIS) provides information on business opportunities, foreign trade legislation, sources of financing, as well as contact information. It will publish a monthly BISNIS Bulletin on trade-related US Government programs and trade promotional events. BISNIS will have a match-making service and publish a "Search for Partners" newsletter.

Linda Nemec
Director, Business Information Service for the NIS
US Department of Commerce
Rm. 7413
Herbert C. Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 202-482-4655
Fax: 202-482-2293

Foreign Commercial Service Offices in the NIS:

Moscow, Russia

Dale Slaght, Senior Commercial Officer
c/o US Embassy
Novinsky Bulvar 15
Tel: 011-7-502-224-1105
Fax: 011-7-502-224-1106

St. Petersburg, Russia

Karen Zens, Commercial Officer
c/o American Consulate General
Ulitsa, Petra Lavrova St. 15
Tel: 011-7-812-274-8235
Fax: 011-7-812-271-4554

Kiev, Ukraine

Stephen Wasylo, Senior Commercial Officer
c/o US Embassy
10 vul. Kotsynskovo
252053 Kiev 53

Tel: 011-7-044-244-7349
Fax: 011-7-044-244-7350

US Trade and Development Program (TDP)

TDP promotes US exports for major development projects in the NIS. It funds feasibility studies, consultancies, training programs, and other project planning services related to major projects.

Daniel Stein
US Trade and Development Program
SA-16, Rm. 309
Washington, DC 20523-1602
Tel: 703-875-4357
Fax: 703-875-4009

Export/Import Bank (Eximbank)

The Eximbank and its insurance contractor, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA), provide insurance, guarantees, and loans to US exporters and commercial banks to facilitate financing for the export of goods and services from the United States to many of the NIS emerging markets.

FCIA Insurance:

Mitchell McCauley
Loan Officer
Eximbank of the US
811 Vermont Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20571
Tel: 202-566-8190
Fax: 202-566-7524

Guarantees and Loans, including Oil and Gas Sector:

John Lentz

(same address as above)
Tel: 202-566-8208
Fax: 202-566-7524

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)

OPIC promotes economic growth in more than 125 developing nations and emerging economies (including all NIS states except Uzbekistan, which is

expected to sign an agreement very shortly) by encouraging US private investment in those nations. OPIC assists American investors through three principal programs:

- Financing investment projects through direct loans and loan guarantees;
- Insuring investment projects against a broad range of political risks; and
- Providing a variety of investor services including advisory services, project development funding, investment missions, computer-assisted joint venture partner matching, and country and regional information kits.

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US Department Of Agriculture (USDA)

USDA is responsible for commercial export programs and several food aid programs including concessional loans, Food for Peace Programs, and commodity grants. A wide array of US agricultural food commodities are eligible for export under these different programs.

USDA also sponsors technical assistance programs for the NIS that support the transition to a private agriculture system.

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US Information Agency (USIA)

USIA is responsible for educational and cultural exchanges, information programs, internships, and training activities that support US policy goals in the new countries. USIA programs aim to assist democratic and economic reform in the new states. In addition to USIA Foreign Service officers posted in NIS Embassies, USIA Washington headquarters works through a number of private sector exchange organizations in the United States.

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Department of the Treasury

The Treasury Department provides technical assistance in macroeconomic policy, government financial operations, and financial sector reform to support development and operation of central and commercial banking institutions.

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